Qualitative Robust Bayesianism and the Likelihood Principle by Mayo-Wilson, Conor & Saraf, Aditya
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
03
87
9v
1 
 [m
ath
.ST
]  
8 S
ep
 20
20
Qualitative Robust Bayesianism and the
Likelihood Principle
Conor Mayo-Wilson and Aditya Saraf∗
September 9, 2020
Abstract
We argue that the likelihood principle (lp) and weak law of likelihood
(ll) generalize naturally to settings in which experimenters are justified
only in making comparative, non-numerical judgments of the form “A
given B is more likely than C given D.” To do so, we first formulate
qualitative analogs of those theses. Then, using a framework for qualita-
tive conditional probability, just as the characterizes when all Bayesians
(regardless of prior) agree that two pieces of evidence are equivalent, so
a qualitative/non-numerical version of lp provides sufficient conditions
for agreement among experimenters’ whose degrees of belief satisfy only
very weak “coherence” constraints. We prove a similar result for ll. We
conclude by discussing the relevance of results to stopping rules.
The central question of this paper is, “Which controversial statistical princi-
ples (e.g., likelihood, conditionality, etc.) are special cases of principles for good
scientific reasoning?” We focus on the likelihood principle (Birnbaum, 1962;
Berger and Wolpert, 1988), the weak law of likelihood (Sober, 2008), and the
strong law of likelihood (Edwards, 1984; Hacking, 1965; Royall, 1997), as these
principles are critical for foundational debates in statistics.
Our central question is motivated by the following observation. Despite
the ubiquity of statistics in contemporary science, many successful instances
of scientific reasoning require only comparative, non-numerical judgments of
evidential strength. For instance, when Lavoisier judged that his data provided
good evidence against the phlogiston theory of combustion and for the existence
of what we now call “oxygen”, no statistics was invoked. Statistical reasoning,
therefore, is just one type of scientific reasoning, and so norms for statistical
reasoning should be special cases of norms for good scientific reasoning.
Our thesis is that likelihood principle (lp) and weak law of likelihood (ll)
generalize naturally to settings in which experimenters are justified only in mak-
ing comparative, non-numerical judgments of the form “A given B is more likely
than C given D.” Specifically, our main results show that, just as lp character-
izes when all Bayesians (regardless of prior) agree that two pieces of evidence are
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equivalent, a qualitative/non-numerical version of lp provides sufficient condi-
tions for agreement among experimenters’ whose degrees of belief satisfy only
very weak “coherence” constraints (i.e., ones that do not entail the probability
axioms). We prove a similar result for ll. In contrast, the strong law of likeli-
hood (ll+) – which asserts that the likelihood ratio is a measure of evidential
strength – has no plausible qualitative analog in our framework.
Our results are important for three related reasons. First, several purported
counterexamples to lp are, we think, more accurately interpreted as objections
to ll+. We discuss one such example in §1. Because our results show that lp
generalizes to qualitative settings in ways ll+ may not, there is good reason to
distinguish the two theses carefully.
Second, our results provide further reason to endorse Berger and Wolpert
(1988, p. 141)’s conclusion that “the only satisfactory method of [statisti-
cal] analysis based on lp seems to be robust Bayesian analysis.” In stan-
dard/quantitative statistical settings, only ll+, we think, provides a founda-
tion for non-Bayesian, likelihoodist techniques; the other two likelihoodist the-
ses (i.e., lp and ll) provide little reason to use maximum-likelihood estimation
or related techniques. Unfortunately, the plausibility of ll+ might be a mod-
eling artifact: when likelihood functions are assumed to be real-valued, ll+
is equivalent to another plausible principle for evidential reasoning, which we
call the “robust Bayesian support principle.” That equivalence, however, breaks
down in more general, qualitative settings. In such settings, the robust Bayesian
favoring principle remains plausible, but ll+ cannot even be articulated.
Finally, lp sometimes recommends against the use of p-values, confidence
intervals, and other classical/frequentist summaries of data. Therefore, if lp
is a special case of a more general, qualitative principle of scientific reasoning,
then some frequentist techniques will conflict with more general principles of
scientific reasoning. In the final section of the paper, we discuss one example of
potentially problematic frequentist reasoning; we show that one argument for
the irrelevance of stopping rules extends naturally to non-statistical data.
1 Likelihoodism
At least three distinct theses are called “the likelihood principle” and are used to
motivate likelihood-based methods (e.g., maximum likelihood estimation) and
Bayesian tools. For clarity, we distinguish the three:
• Likelihood principle (lp): Let E and F are outcomes of two experiments
E and F respectively. If there is some c > 0 such that P Eθ (E) = c · P
F
θ (F )
for all θ ∈ Θ, then E and F are evidentially equivalent.
• Weak Law of likelihood (ll): P Eθ1(E) > P
E
θ2
(E) if and only if the data E
favors θ1 over θ2.
• Strong Law of likelihood (ll+): The likelihood ratio P Eθ1(E)/P
E
θ2
(E) quan-
tifies the degree to which the data E favors θ1 over θ2.
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For likelihoodists (who endorse the above principles but do not embrace Bayesian-
ism), the notions of “evidential equivalence” and “favoring” are undefined primi-
tives that are axiomatized by principles like lp and ll. Likelihoodists, therefore,
defend lp, ll, and ll+ by arguing the three principles accord with (i) our in-
formed reflections about evidential strength, (ii) accepted statistical methods
that have been successfully applied in science, and (iii) other plausible and less-
controversial “axioms” for statistical inference (e.g., the sufficiency principle).
Notice that ll and ll+ concern only simple/point hypotheses (i.e., ele-
ments of Θ); the extension of those theses to composite hypotheses (i.e., sub-
sets of Θ) is controversial, especially when nuisance parameters are present
(see e.g., Royall (1997) [§1.7 and Chapter 7] and Bickel (2012) for different
strategies). ll+ is stronger than ll in two related ways: it allows one to (1)
compare the strength of two pieces of evidence E and F by assessing whether
P Eθ1(E)/P
E
θ2
(E) ≥ P Fθ1(F )/P
F
θ2
(F ) or vice versa, and (2) compare pieces of evi-
dence drawn from different experiments. Two examples will clarify and distin-
guish the theses.
Example 1: Suppose two experiments are designed to distinguish Θ = {θ1, θ2}.
The possible outcomes of the experiments (A,B,C,A′, etc.) are the column
headers in the tables below, and the likelihood functions are the column vectors.
We intentionally list only two possible outcomes of Experiment F.
Experiment E
A B C
θ1 .423 .564 .011
θ2 .039 .052 .909
Experiment F
A′ B′ . . .
θ1 .846 .12 . . .
θ2 .078 .01 . . .
According to lp, the outcomes A and B from E are evidentially equivalent to
one another because P Eθ1(A) = 3/4 ·P
E
θ1
(B) for all θ ∈ {θ1, θ2}. Similarly, both A
and B are evidentially equivalent to observing A′ in F as P Eθ1(A) = 1/2 ·P
F
θ1
(A′)
for all θ. However, lp says nothing about which of the hypotheses in Θ are
favored by A,B, and B′. In general, lp tells one only when two samples should
yield identical estimates, but it says nothing about what those estimates should
be.
According to ll, the outcome A “favors” θ1 over θ2 because P
E
θ1
(A) >
P Eθ2(A). Similarly, ll entails thatB favors θ1 over θ2. However, ll tells one noth-
ing about how strong those pieces of evidence are, and in particular, whether A
and B provide evidence of equal or different strength.
In contrast, ll+ entails that A and B favor θ1 to θ2 to the same de-
gree, and both A and B are weaker pieces of evidence than than B′ because
P Eθ1(A)/P
E
θ2
(A) < 12 = P Fθ1(B
′)/P Fθ2(B
′). Notice that both ll+ and lp allow one
to draw conclusions about evidential value without knowing the sample space of
the second experiment. It is for this reason that authors often stress that like-
lihoodist principles entail the “irrelevancy of the sample space” (Royall, 1997,
§1.11).
(End Example)
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Failure to distinguish the above theses carefully, we think, has caused confu-
sion in debates about lp. For instance, (Evans et al., 1986) offer the following
example as a challenge to lp; the example is due to (Fraser et al., 1984).
Example 2: Suppose Θ = Ω = N+ = {1, 2, . . .} and that Pθ assigns equal
probability of 1/3 to each of the values in {⌊θ/2⌋, 2θ, 2θ+ 1}. Here, ⌊x⌋ rounds
x down to the nearest integer except when x = 1/2, in which case ⌊1/2⌋ = 1.
Fraser et al. (1984) note that, surprisingly, although the likelihood function is
in some sense “flat”, the estimator θˆL(n) = {⌊n/2⌋} gives a 2/3 confidence set,
whereas the estimators θˆM (n) = {2n} and θˆH(ω) = {2n+1} each have coverage
only 1/3. Evans et al. (1986) conclude, “Examples such as this would seem to
make the likelihood principle questionable for statistical inference.”
However, in this example, lp implies only the unobjectionable claim that
each ω ∈ Ω is evidentially equivalent to itself. To see why, suppose n,m ∈ Ω
are distinct, and so we may assume n > m without loss of generality. Recall
that lp says that n and m are evidentially equivalent if there is some constant c
such that Pθ(n) = c ·Pθ(m) for all θ. To see that lp fails to entail that n and m
are evidentially equivalent, let θ0 = 2n. Then, Pθ0(n) = 1/3, while Pθ0(m) = 0
since m < ⌊θ0/2⌋ = n. Thus, there is no c > 0 such that Pθ(n) = c · Pθ(m) for
all θ. Hence, lp says nothing about the relationship between distinct outcomes.
One might think the example challenges ll and ll+. Because only θˆL(n) =
{⌊n/2⌋} gives a 2/3 confidence set, one might infer that observing n favors ⌊n/2⌋
over 2n and 2n + 1. But ll and ll+ entail that n does not favor any of the
parameters ⌊n/2⌋, 2n or 2n+1 over the others. Although we think the example
is not a problem for ll or ll+, we will not argue so here. For now, we stress
that the example shows the importance of distinguishing lp from ll+ and ll.
(End Example)
The failure to distinguish ll from lp, we conjecture, is a result of assum-
ing that the mathematical formulations of lp (like Birnbaum (1962)’s above)
capture certain informal statements of the principle. Many practitioners quote
Berger and Wolpert (1988, p. 1)’s informal gloss of lp; they say that lp “es-
sentially states that all evidence, which is obtained from an experiment, about
an unknown quantity θ, is contained in the likelihood function of θ for the
given data.” Yet other informal glosses of lp differ significantly. For exam-
ple, Birnbaum (1962, p. 271) says lp asserts the “irrelevance of [experimental]
outcomes not actually observed.” Although these informal statements capture
important insights about likelihoodist theses, we think care should be taken to
stick to the technical statements when evaluating particular examples, as shown
above.
Distinguishing the three theses is also important for understanding which
statistical tests and techniques are justified by each. For instance, as we noted
above, the formal statement of lp says nothing about which estimates are fa-
vored by a sample. ll entails that the mle is always favored over rivals, but
it does not say by how much. Thus, ll is of little use when the fit of the mle
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needs to be weighed against considerations of simplicity and prior plausibility.
Only ll+, we think, can be used to justify likelihoodist estimation procedures,
but sadly, it is also the only thesis that has no obvious qualitative analog in our
framework below.
2 Baysianism and Likelihoodism
ll, lp, and ll+ are often said to be “compatible” with Bayes rule (Edwards,
1984, p. 28). Here is how that “compatibility” is often explained for ll+. Think
of an experiment E as a pair 〈ΩE, {P Eθ }θ∈Θ〉, where Ω
E represents the possible
outcomes of the experiment and P Eθ (·) is a probability distribution over Ω
E that
specifies how likely each outcome is if θ is the true value of the parameter.
Suppose Q is a prior probability distribution over Θ, which we will assume is
finite for the remainder of the paper to avoid measurability assumptions. Define
the posterior in the standard way:
QE(H |E) =
QE(E ∩H)
QE(E)
:=
∑
θ∈H P
E
θ (E) ·Q(θ)∑
θ∈Θ P
E
θ (E) ·Q(θ)
for any H ⊆ Θ. Then Bayes’ Rule entails
QE(θ1|E)
QE(θ2|E)
=
P Eθ1(E)
P Eθ2(E)
·
Q(θ1)
Q(θ2)
Although this calculation is standard in introductory remarks about Bayes rules
(e.g., see (Gelman et al., 2013, p. 8)), we note that it holds for any prior Q. So
the likelihood ratio is a measure of the degree to which all Bayesians’ posterior
degrees of belief in θ1 increase (or decrease) upon learning E. We introduce
another way of capturing that same idea below.
We would like to suggest one new argument for ll+, as it will be important
below. ll+ unifies ll and lp, in the sense that it entails both theses. Why?
Assume that, for every piece of evidence E and any two hypotheses θ1 and θ2,
there is a numerical degree deg(E, θ1, θ2) to which E favors θ1 over θ2 (here, the
degree might be negative). To show ll+ entails ll under plausible assumptions,
say that E favors θ1 over θ2 if deg(E, θ1, θ2) > deg(Ω, θ1, θ2), in other words, if
E provides better evidence for θ1 (over θ2) than the sure event. If ll
+ holds,
then deg(E, θ1, θ2) = Pθ1(E)/Pθ2(E), and so E favors θ1 over θ2 precisely if
Pθ1(E)/Pθ2(E) = deg(E, θ1, θ2) > deg(Ω, θ1, θ2) = Pθ1(Ω)/Pθ2(Ω) = 1. In other
words, ll+ plus the above assumptions entails that E favors θ1 over θ2 precisely
if Pθ1(E) > Pθ2(E), exactly as ll asserts.
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To show ll+ entails lp under plausible assumptions, say that E and F are
evidentially equivalent if deg(E, θ1, θ2) = deg(F, θ1, θ2) for all θ1 and θ2. In
other words, E and F favor all hypotheses by equal amounts. Again, if ll+
1Notice, we drop the superscript E when it’s clear from context.
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holds, then deg(E, θ1, θ2) = Pθ1(E)/Pθ2(E), and so E and F are evidentially
equivalent precisely if
Pθ1(E)
Pθ2(E)
=
Pθ1(F )
Pθ2(F )
(1)
for all θ1 and θ2. If there is c > 0 such that Pθ(E) = c · Pθ(F ) for all θ, then
holds. So ll+ entails lp.
In sum, (i) ll+ is “compatible” with Bayes rule in the sense that the like-
lihood ratio is also the ratio of all Bayesians’ posterior to prior probabilities,
and (ii) ll+ entails both ll and lp, which are also thought to be intuitively
plausible (and are “compatible” with Bayesianism in still other ways). In the
next section, we first prove that ll+ is compatible with Bayes rule in another
important way: it characterizes when all Bayesians agree that E is better ev-
idence than F . In the second half of the paper, we show that the qualitative
analog of such Bayesian agreement unifies qualitative analogs of ll and lp in
the same way ll+ unifies quantitative versions of those principles.
2.1 Robust Bayesianism and Likelihoodism
Robust Bayesianism is roughly the thesis that statistical decisions should be
stable under a variety of different prior distributions (Berger, 1990; Kadane,
1984). In this section, we discuss three elementary propositions that show like-
lihoodist theses characterize when all Bayesians agree about how evidence ought
to change one’s posterior. The propositions, we think, clarify why advocates of
robust Bayesian analysis have found likelihoodist theses so attractive. The main
results of our paper – in the next section – are the qualitative analogs of the
second and third claim below.
Before stating our main definition, we introduce some notation. Given an
experiment E, we let ∆E = Θ×ΩE. We use H1, H2 etc. to denote subsets of Θ,
and E,F , etc. to denote subsets of Ω. Again, we drop the superscript E when
it is clear from context. We will write Q(·|H) and Q(·|E) instead of Q(·|H ×Ω)
and Q(·|Θ× E), and similarly for events to the left of the conditioning bar.
Definition 1. Suppose H1, H2 ⊆ Θ are disjoint. Let E and F be outcomes of
experiments E and F respectively. Say E Bayesian supports H1 over H2 at least
as much as F if QE(H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) ≥ QF(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) for all priors
Q for which QF(·|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) is well-defined. If the inequality is strict for all
such Q, then we say E Bayesian supports H1 over H2 strictly more than F . In
the former case, we write E BH1DH2F , and in the latter, we write E
B
H1
≫H2F .
Our first goal is to find a necessary and sufficient condition for Bayesian
support that involves only likelihoods. The following claim does exactly that.
Claim 1. Suppose H1 and H2 are finite and disjoint. Let E and F be outcomes
of experiments E and F respectively. Then E BH1DH2F if and only if (1) for all
θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2, if P Fθ (F ) > 0, then P
E
θ (E) > 0, and (2) for all θ1 ∈ H1 and
θ2 ∈ H2:
P Eθ1(E) · P
F
θ2
(F ) ≥ P Eθ2(E) · P
F
θ1
(F )
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Similarly, E BH1≫H2F if and only if 1 holds and the inequality in the above
equation is always strict.
We omit the proof, as it uses only basic probability theory. However, details
of all omitted proofs (including the elementary ones) in this paper can be found
in the appendix. The claim asserts that E BH1DH2F exactly when ll
+ says that
E provides stronger evidence for θ1 over θ2 than F does. The Bayesian support
relation, therefore, is one way of clarifying how a robust Bayesian can interpret
the notion of “favoring” in likelihoodist theses like ll+. This is important
because, as we show below, the Bayesian support relation has a direct qualitative
analog, unlike ll+, which requires numerical degrees of favoring.
The Bayesian support relation is also important because it can be used
to define the following notions of “Bayesian favoring” and “Bayesian favoring
equivalence” that are respectively equivalent to the notions of “favoring” in
ll and “evidential equivalence” in lp. This should be unsurprising given our
argument above that ll+ can be used to derive ll and lp under plausible
assumptions.
Definition 2. E Bayesian favors H1 to H2 if E
B
H1
DH2Ω. Say it strictly does
if E BH1≫H2Ω.
So Bayesian favoring is a special case of Bayesian support. In essence, the
support relation compares (a) how much E Bayesian favors H1 to H2 to (b)
how much F Bayesian favors H1 to H2. Thus, the next claim, which shows that
Bayesian favoring is equivalent to ll, follows directly from Claim 1.
Claim 2. E Bayesian favors H1 to H2 if and only if (1) Pθ(E) > 0 for all
θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2 and (2) Pθ1(E) ≥ Pθ2(E) for all θ1 ∈ H1 and θ2 ∈ H2. If
H1 = {θ1} and H2 = {θ2} are simple, E strictly Bayesian favors H1 to H2 if
and only if ll entails E favors H1 to H2.
Next, we study two robust Bayesian notions of evidential equivalence that
are easy to translate to the qualitative setting.
Definition 3. Say E and F are Bayesian posterior equivalent if all priors Q (1)
QE(·|E) is well-defined if and only if QF(·|F ) is, and (2)QE(H |E) = QF(H |F ) for
all hypotheses H and for which those conditional probabilities are well-defined.
Definition 4. E and F are Bayesian favoring equivalent if F BH1DH2E and
E BH1DH2F for all disjoint hypotheses H1 and H2. In other words, E and F are
Bayesian favoring equivalent if for any prior Q and any disjoint hypotheses H1
and H2 we have (1) Q
E(·|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) is well-defined if and only if QF(·|F ∩
(H1∪H2)) is well-defined and (2) Q
E(H1|E∩(H1∪H2)) = Q
F(H1|E∩(H1∪H2))
whenever those conditional probabilities are well-defined.
It is well-known that, if lp entails E and F are evidentially equivalent, then
they are posterior equivalent (Edwards et al., 1984, p. 56); that fact makes
precise in what sense lp is compatible with Bayesianism. This is one reason we
conjecture that some researchers (e.g., see Example 3 of Wechsler et al. (2008))
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have isolated posterior equivalence as a relation worthy of study. It is easy to
show that posterior and favoring equivalence are identical relations.
Claim 3. The following are equivalent: (1) lp entails E and F are evidentially
equivalent, (2) E and F are Bayesian posterior equivalent, (3) E and F are
Bayesian favoring equivalent.
The three claims above show that there is an alternative way of explaining
why (1) ll+ and lp are intuitively plausible in many cases and (2) ll+ “unifies”
ll and lp. To see why, consider one last philosophical thesis about statistical
evidence.
Robust Bayesian Support Principle: E provides at least as good statistical evi-
dence for H1 over H2 as F if E
B
H1
DH2F .
By Claim 1, the robust Bayesian support principle is equivalent to ll+. And
by Claim 2 and Claim 3, it entails ll and lp with some plausible, additional
assumptions, thereby “unifying” ll and lp in roughly the same way ll+ does.
Thus, ll+ may be plausible only because it is equivalent to the robust Bayesian
support principle in common statistical settings. And the robust Bayesian sup-
port principle is plausible, we conjecture, precisely because it captures the idea
that evidence persuades all rational parties to change their beliefs in particular
ways. This is important because, as we now show, the robust Bayesian principle
generalizes to qualitative settings in which ll+ cannot be formulated.
3 Qualitative Likelihoodism
3.1 Key Concepts
To move from quantitative to qualitative probability, we replace probability
functions with two orderings. As before, let Θ be the set of simple hypotheses,
and for any experiment E, we let ΩE the set of experimental outcomes. The
first relation, ⊑E, is the qualitative analog of the set of likelihood functions.
As before, we drop E when it’s clear from context. Informally, A|θ ⊑ B|η
represents the claim that “experimental outcome B is at least as likely under
supposition η as outcome A is under supposition θ”; it is the qualitative analog
of Pθ(A) ≤ Pη(B). We write A|θ ≡ B|θ if A|θ ⊑ B|θ and vice versa.
Although we typically consider expressions of the form A|θ ⊑ B|η, the ⊑
relation is also defined when experimental outcomes E ⊆ Ω appear to the right
Quantitative Probabilistic Notions Qualitative Analog
P Eθ (E) ≤ P
F
υ (F ) E|θ ⊑ F |υ
QE(H1|E) ≤ Q
F(H2|F ) H1|E  H2|F
ll⇔ E Bayesian favors H1 to H2 qll⇔ E qualitatively favors H1 to H2.
lp⇔ E and F are Bayesian posterior and favoring
equivalent
qlp
− ⇒ E and F are qualitatively posterior and
favoring equivalent.
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of the conditioning bar, i.e., A|θ ∩ E ⊑ A|θ ∩ F is a well-defined expression if
E,F ⊆ Ω. However, it is not-well defined when composite hypotheses H appear
to the right of the conditioning bar, just as there are no likelihood functions
PH(·) for composite hypotheses in the quantitative case.
Bayesians assume that beliefs are representable by a probability function.
We weaken that assumption and assume beliefs are representable by an ordering
 on P(∆) × P(∆), where P(∆) is the power set of ∆. As before, if E ⊆ Ω
and H ⊆ Θ we write E|H instead of Θ×E|H ×Ω. In the special case in which
H = {θ} is a singleton, we omit the curly brackets and write E|θ instead of
E|{θ}. We write A|B ∼ C|D is A|B  C|D and vice versa.
The notation is suggestive; A|B  C|D if the experimenter regards C as at
least as likely under supposition D as A would be under supposition B. Just as
Bayesians condition on both composite hypotheses and experimental outcomes,
there are no restrictions on what can appear to the right of the conditioning bar
in expressions involving .
Clearly, to prove anything, we must assume that ⊑ and  satisfy certain
constraints; those constraints are specified in Section 3.3. But before stating
those constraints, we state our main results.
3.2 Main Results
It is now easy to state a qualitative analog of ll:
• Qualitative law of likelihood (qll): E favors θ1 to θ2 if E|θ2 ⊏ E|θ1.
Claim 2 asserts that ll characterizes precisely when E Bayesian favors θ1
over θ2, i.e., when all Bayesian agents agree E favors one hypothesis over an-
other. So by analogy to the definition of. “Bayesian support” and “Bayesian
favoring”, define:
Definition 5. E qualitatively favors H1 to H2 at least as much as F if H1|E ∩
(H1 ∪H2)  H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) for all orderings  satisfying the axioms below
and for which the expression ·|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) is well-defined.
Definition 6. E qualitatively favors H1 to H2 if E supports H1 to H2 at least
as much as Ω.
Our first major result is the qualitative analog of Claim 2. Just as Claim 2
entails that E Bayesian favors θ1 to θ2 when ll entails so, our first major
result shows that E qualitatively favors θ1 to θ2 if and only if qll entails so.
Under mild assumptions, this equivalence can be extended to finite composite
hypotheses.
Theorem 1. Suppose H1 and H2 are finite. Then E qualitatively favors H1
over H2 if (1) ∅|θ ⊏ E|θ for all θ ∈ H1 ∪H2 and (2) E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for all θ1 ∈ H1
and θ2 ∈ H2. Under Assumption 1 (below), the converse holds as well. In both
directions, the favoring inequality is strict exactly when the likelihood inequality
is strict. If H1 = {θ1} and H2 = {θ2} are simple, then E qualitatively favors H1
9
over H2 if and only if qll entails so. No additional assumptions are required
in this case.
Assumption 1 below more-or-less says that one’s “prior” ordering over the hy-
potheses is unconstrained by the “likelihood” relation ⊆. This is exactly anal-
ogous to the quantitative probability theory. In the quantitative case, a joint
distribution QE on ∆ = Θ× ΩE is determined (i) the measures 〈Pθ(·)〉θ∈Θ over
experimental outcomes ΩE and (ii) one’s prior Q over the hypotheses Θ. Al-
though the joint distribution QE is constrained by 〈Pθ(·)〉θ∈Θ, one’s prior Q on
Θ is not, and so for any non-empty hypothesis H ⊆ Θ, one can define some Q
such that Q(H) = 1 and Q(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ H . That’s what the following
assumption says in the qualitative case.
Assumption 1. For all orderings ⊑ satisfying the axioms above and for all
non-empty H ⊆ Θ, there exists an ordering  satisfying the axioms such that
(A) H |∆ ∼ ∆|∆ and (B) θ|∆ ≻ ∅|∆ for all θ ∈ H .
We believe Assumption 1 is provable, but we have not yet produced a proof.
Our second main result is a qualitative analog of Claim 3, which says that lp
characterizes when two pieces of evidence are posterior and Bayesian-favoring
equivalent. The qualitative analogs of posterior equivalence and favoring equiv-
alence are obvious, but we state them for full clarity.
Definition 7. E and F are qualitative favoring equivalent if E supports H1
over H2 at least as much as F and vice versa, for any two disjoint hypotheses
H1 and H2.
Definition 8. E and F are qualitative posterior equivalent if all orderings 
that satisfy the axioms (1) the expression ·|E is well-defined if and only if ·|E
is, and (2) H |E ∼ H |F for all hypotheses H ⊆ Θ.
As before, these two definitions are equivalent.
Claim 4. E and F are qualitative posterior equivalent if and only if they are
qualitative favoring equivalent.
Although posterior and favoring equivalence are easy to make qualitative,
what about lp? Quantitatively, the statement of lp mentions both multipli-
cation and a global constant c > 0, which seem difficult to translate to the
qualitative setting.
Notice, however, that we can multiply probabilities when two events are
independent. So suppose E and F are outcomes of the same experiment and
1. Pθ(E) = Pθ(F ∩ Cθ) for all θ,
2. For all θ ∈ Θ, the events F and Cθ are conditionally independent given θ,
and
3. Pθ(Cθ) = Pυ(Cυ) > 0 for all θ, υ ∈ Θ.
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Roughly, the event Cθ acts as a witness to the equality Pθ(E) = c · Pθ(F ).
Specifically, assumptions 1 and 2 encode the equality, and assumption 3 asserts
this constant is invariant with respect to the parameter θ.
By lp, the three conditions entail that E and F are evidentially equivalent.
The proof is simple. Let c = Pθ0(Cθ0) for any θ0 ∈ Θ. Then for all θ:
Pθ(E) = Pθ(F ∩ Cθ) by Assumption 1
= Pθ(F ) · Pθ(Cθ) by Assumption 2
= c · Pθ(F ) by Assumption 3
Since Pθ(E) = c · Pθ(F ) for all θ, then E and F are evidentially equivalent by
lp.
For an example, suppose we are trying to discern the type of an unmarked
urn, with colored balls in frequencies according to the table below. Let B and
W respectively denote the events that one draws a blue and a white ball on
the first draw. By lp, these events are equivalent, as Pθ(B) = 1/2 · Pθ(W )
for all θ ∈ {θ1, θ2}, which denote the urn type. We can see this equivalence in
another way. Let C1/C2 respectively denote the events that, after replacing the
first draw, one draws a cyan/cobalt ball respectively on the second draw. Then,
Pθ1(W∩C1) = Pθ1(W )·Pθ1(C1) = 1/2·Pθ1(W ) = Pθ1(B) by independence of the
draws, if the urn is Type 1. Similarly, Pθ2(W ∩C2) = Pθ2(W ) · Pθ2(C2) = 1/2 ·
Pθ2(W ) = Pθ2(B), if the urn is Type 2. By lp, because Pθ1(C1) = Pθ2(C2) > 0
and Pθi(B) = Pθi(W ∩ Ci) = Pθi(Ci) · Pθi(W ) for all i, we know B and W are
evidentially equivalent.
Number of balls
Blue White Cyan Cobalt Total
Urn Type 1 15 30 50 5 100
Urn Type 2 10 20 20 50 100
So define lp− to be the thesis that, if conditions 1-3 hold, then E and F
are evidentially equivalent. We just showed that, if lp− entails E and F are
evidentially equivalent, then so does lp. By Claim 3, it follows that E and F
are also Bayesian posterior and favoring equivalent. Our second major result is
the qualitative analog of that fact.
Because conditions 1-3 do not contain any arithmetic operations, each has
a direct qualitative analog. The only slightly tricky condition is the second. To
define a qualitative analog of conditional independence, note that two events A
andB are conditionally independent given C if and only if P (A|B∩C) = P (A|C)
or P (B ∩ C) = 0. Analogously, we will say events A and B are qualitatively
conditionally independent given C if A|B ∩ C ∼ A|C or B ∩ C ∈ N . In this
case, we write A ⊥C B.
2
Our second main result is the following:
Theorem 2. Let {Cθ}θ∈Θ be events such that
2The lemmas below show this definition of (qualitative) independence has the desired
properties. For example, Lemma 8 entails A ⊥C B if and only if B ⊥C A.
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1. E|θ ≡ F ∩ Cθ|θ for all θ ∈ Θ,
2. F ⊥ θ Cθ for all θ ∈ Θ, and
3. ∅|θ ⊏ Cθ|θ ≡ Cη|η for all θ, η ∈ Θ.
If Θ is finite, then E and F are qualitatively posterior and favoring equivalent.
The following corollary of Theorem 2 is the qualitative analog of the fact
that when Pθ(E) = Pθ(F ) (i.e., when the constant c in lp equals one), then
E and F are posterior and favoring equivalent. In the quantitative case, the
corollary is trivial because one can let Cθ = ∆ for all θ. The three conditions
of Theorem 2 are satisfied then since (1) Pθ(E) = Pθ(F ) = Pθ(F ∩ ∆) for all
θ by assumption, (2) F and ∆ are conditionally independent given every θ, as
Pθ(F ∩∆) = Pθ(F ) = Pθ(F ) · 1 = Pθ(F ) · Pθ(∆), and (3) Pθ(∆) = 1 > 0 for
all θ ∈ Θ. Analogous reasoning works in the qualitative case using the axioms
below.
Corollary 1. If Θ is finite and E|θ ≡ F |θ, then E and F are qualitatively
posterior and favoring equivalent.
3.3 Axioms for Qualitative Probability
We assume that both ⊑ and  satisfy the first set of axioms below. To state the
axioms, therefore, we let ◭ be either ⊑ or , and let ◭ be the corresponding
“strict” inequality defined by x ◭ y if x ◭ y and y ✓◭ x. Define A|B
N
= C|D if
and only if A|B ◭ C|D and vice versa.
Axiom 1: ◭ is a weak order (i.e., it is linear/total, reflexive, and transi-
tive).
Axiom 3: A|A
N
= B|B and A|B ◭ ∆|C for all C 6∈ N .
Axiom 4: A ∩B|B
N
= A|B.
Axiom 5: Suppose A∩B = A′∩B′ = ∅. If A|C ◭ A′|C′ and B|C ◭ B′|C′,
then A ∪B|C ◭ A′ ∪B′|C′; moreover, if either hypothesis is ◭, then the
conclusion is ◭.
Axiom 6: Suppose C ⊆ B ⊆ A and C′ ⊆ B′ ⊆ A′.
Axiom 6a: If B|A ◭ C′|B′ and C|B ◭ B′|A′, then C|A ◭ C′|A′;
moreover, if either hypothesis is ◭, the conclusion is ◭.
Axiom 6b: If B|A ◭ B′|A′ and C|B ◭ C′|B′, then C|A ◭ C′|A′;
moreover, if either hypothesis is ◭ and C /∈ N , the conclusion is ◭.
We discuss Axiom 2 below, as it is different for ⊑ and . The above axioms
are due to (Krantz et al., 2006b, p. 222) and enumerated in the same order
as in that text. What we call Axiom 6b is what they call Axiom 6’ (p. 227).
12
For several reasons (e.g., there is no Archimedean condition), our axioms are
not sufficient for  to be representable as either a (conditional) probability
measure or a set of probability measures. Thus the axioms represent weaker
“coherence” constraints on belief than are typically assumed by Bayesian deci-
sion theorists. See Alon and Lehrer (2014) for a recent representation theorem
for sets of probability measures, and see (Kraft et al., 1959) and (Krantz et al.,
2006a, p. 205-206) for examples illustrating that the axioms are not sufficient
for representability as a conditional probability measure.
Axioms 1, 3, 4, and 5, are fairly analogous to facts of quantitative probability.
Axiom 6 is useful because it allows us to “multiply” in a qualitative setting.
To see its motivation, consider Axiom 6a and note that if C ⊆ B ⊆ A and
C′ ⊆ B′ ⊆ A′, then
P (C|B) =
P (C)
P (B)
and P (B|A) =
P (B)
P (A)
,
and similarly for the A′, B′, and C′. So if P (B|A) ≥ P (C′|B′) and P (C|B) ≥
P (B′|A′), then
P (B)
P (A)
≥
P (C′)
P (B′)
and
P (C)
P (B)
≥
P (B′)
P (A′)
.
When we multiply the left and right-hand sides of those inequalties, we obtain
P (C)/P (A) ≥ P (C′)/P (A′), which is equivalent to P (C|A) ≥ P (C′|A′) given
our assumption about the nesting of the sets. Axiom 6b can be motivated
similarly.
In addition to these axioms, in statistical contexts, one typically assumes
that experimenters agree upon the likelihood functions of the data, which means
that, in discrete contexts, QE(·|θ) = P Eθ (·) whenever Q(θ) > 0. Similarly, we
assume that  extends ⊑ in the following sense:
Axiom 0: If B,D 6∈ N and B,D ∈ Θ × P(Ω), then A|B  C|D if and
only if A|B ⊑ C|D.
We now return to Axiom 2, which concerns probability zero events. For
any given fixed θ, the conditional probability Pθ(·|E) is undefined if and only if
Pθ(E) = 0. Similarly, we define N⊑ to be all and only sets of that form {θ}×E
such that E|θ ⊑ ∅|θ. We call such events ⊑-null. Notice that an experimenter
may have a prior that assigns a parameter θ ∈ Θ zero probability, even if
Pθ(E) > 0 for all events E. So the set of null events, in the experimenter’s joint
distribution, will contain all of the null events for each Pθ plus many others.
Accordingly, we assume the following about -null events.
Axiom 2 (for ⊑): θ×Ω 6∈ N⊑ for all θ, and A ∈ N⊑ if and only if A = θ×E
and E|θ ⊑ ∅|θ.
Axiom 2 (for ): ∆ 6∈ N , and A ∈ N if and only if A|∆  ∅|∆.
We say an expression of the form ·|A is undefined with respect to  / ⊑ if
A is null with respect to the appropriate relation. Because it is typically clear
from context, we do not specify with respect to which ordering an expression is
undefined.
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4 Comparing Experiments: Stopping Rules and
Mixtures
One of the most controversial consequences of lp is that it entails the “irrele-
vance of stopping rules” (e.g., see Savage’s contribution to Savage et al. (1962)).
However, the qualitative version of lp we have stated, one might argue, has no
such implication. Why? The careful reader will have noticed that the relations
⊑ and  are always implicitly indexed to a fixed experiment. For example, we
defined  to be an ordering on P(∆)×P(∆), where ∆ = Θ×ΩE for some fixed
experiment E. Thus, on first glance, our qualitative “analog” of lp does not al-
low one to compare the likelihoods of results drawn from different experiments,
and such a comparison is precisely what is at issue in debates about stopping
rules.
In this section, we argue that our results do not have this limitation, at least
for an important class of “non-informative” stopping rules (Raiffa and Schlaifer,
1961). To do so, let us first clarify what it means for a stopping rule to be
“irrelevant.” From the robust Bayesian perspective, the choice between two
stopping rules sE and sF is typically called “irrelevant” if, whenever an outcome
ω can be obtained from two experiments E and F that differ only in their
respective stopping rules sE and sF respectively, it follows that Q
E(H |ω) =
QF(H |ω) for any hypothesis H ⊆ Θ and any prior Q. In other words, the
stopping rule is irrelevant if, for any outcome ω that can be obtained in both
experiments, observing ω in E is posterior equivalent to observing ω in F. Below,
we say what it means for two experiments to “differ only” in their stopping rules.
To generalize this idea to the qualitative setting, we characterize irrelevance
in a second, equivalent way. Imagine a mixed experiment is conducted in which
a fair coin is flipped to decide whether to conduct experiment E or F. Let 〈E, ω〉
denote the outcome of M in which the coin lands heads, E is conducted, and ω
is observed. Clearly the following two conditions are equivalent:
1. QE(H |ω) = QF(H |ω) for any prior Q and hypothesis H .
2. QM(H |〈E, ω〉) = QM(H |〈F, ω〉) for any prior Q and hypothesis H .
Notice the second condition requires only comparing posterior probabilities
of outcomes of a single experiment, M. Therefore, we use the second condition
in our definition of irrelevance of stopping rules, as it generalizes to the quali-
tative setting in which one cannot directly compare posterior probabilities from
different experiments.
Definition 9. Given two experiments E and F that differ only in stopping rule,
we say knowledge of the stopping rule is E/F-irrelevant if, for any ω that can be
obtained in both experiments, the outcomes 〈E, ω〉 and 〈F, ω〉 ofM are posterior
equivalent, where M is the mixed experiment in which a fair coin is flipped to
decide whether to conduct E or F.
Below, we argue that the choice between certain pairs of stopping rules
is irrelevant in this sense. Our argument is a straightforward application of
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Corollary 1. We begin by identifying the stopping rules we will focus on and
what it means for two experiments to “differ only” in stopping rule.
4.1 Non-Informative Stopping Rules
Often, the data-generating process in an experiment E is decomposable into two
parts (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961, §2.3). The first part
hE(~x; θ1) = f
E(x1; θ1) · f
E(x2|x1; θ1) · · · f
E(xn|x1, . . . xn−1; θ1)
determines the chances that a measurement device takes a sequence of values
~x = 〈x1, . . . xn〉. Those probabilities are a function exclusively of the parameter
of interest θ1. The second component φ(n; θ1, θ2), which is called the stopping
rule, determines the probability that an additional measurement is made at all,
and its values might be affected by innumerable factors in addition to the value
of the parameter of interest (e.g., budget, time, etc.); we can represent those
factors by the nuisance parameter θ2. The probability of stopping after n many
points is
sE(n|~x; θ1, θ2) = φ(x1; θ1, θ2) · · ·φ(n|x1, . . . , xn−1; θ1, θ2) · (1−φ(n+1|~x; θ1, θ2)),
and so letting θ = 〈θ1, θ2〉, one can factor the likelihood function as follows:
P Eθ (~x) = h
E(~x; θ1) · s
E(n|~x; θ1, θ2)
A very special - but still controversial - case is when sE depends on neither
parameter and is either zero or or one, depending on ~x. Such stopping rules
form a special subset of what Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) call “non-informative”
stopping rules, and they can easily be seen to be irrelevant in the sense above.
Why? Suppose two experiments E and F have the same data-generating mech-
anism h(~x; θ); this is what it means for the two experiments to “differ only” in
stopping rule. Further, suppose both sE and sF depend on neither parameter,
and assume that sE(~x) and sE(~y) are always either zero or or one. If a sample
~x can be obtained with positive probability in both experiments, then
P Eθ (~x) = h(~x; θ) · s
E(n|~x) = h(~x; θ) = h(~x; θ) · sF(n|~x) = P Fθ (~x).
Thus, the likelihood function of ~x is the exactly the same (not just proportional!)
in both experiments, and so observing ~x in E is posterior equivalent to observ-
ing ~x in F, as claimed. Notice that a likelihoodist who rejects a fully Bayesian
viewpoint could also argue that the choice between such stopping rules is ir-
relevant because, by the likelihood principle, outcomes obtained in experiments
that differ only by such stopping rules are evidentially equivalent.
Example 3: Suppose you are interested whether the fraction θ of people who
survive three months of a new cancer treatment exceeds the survival rate of the
conventional treatment, which is known to be 94%. Two experimental designs
are considered: E, which consists in treating 100 patients, and F, which consists
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in treating patients until two deaths are recorded. In both experiments, it
is possible to treat 100 patients and record precisely two deaths, the second of
which is the 100th patient. Let ~x be a binary sequence of length 100 representing
such a data set, and note that P Eθ (~x) = P
F
θ (~x) = θ
2 · (1 − θ)98 no matter the
survival rate θ. Here, the stopping rules of the respective experiments are given
by:
φE(n|x1, . . . xn−1; θ) =
{
1 if n < 100
0 otherwise
and
φF(n|x1, . . . xn−1; θ) =
{
1 if
∑
k≤n−1 xk < 2
0 otherwise
By the arguments above, the choice between the two stopping rules are
irrelevant from both a robust Bayesian and likelihoodist perspective. However,
a quick calculation shows that under the null hypothesis – that the new drug is
no more effective than the conventional treatment – the chance of two or fewer
deaths in E is .0566, which is not significant at the .05 level. In contrast, in
F, the chance of treating 100 or more patients under the null is .014, which is
significant at the .05 level. Advocates of classical testing sometimes conclude,
therefore, that the latter experiment provides better evidence against the null
than the former. This indicates a way in which lp is at odds with some classical
testing procedures.
4.2 Qualitative Irrelevance of Stopping Rules
We now argue that, in our qualitative framework, the special class of stopping
rules discussed in the previous section are irrelevant. Of course, it is unclear
what the analog of “factoring” likelihood functions is in our qualitative frame-
work, and so one might wonder what exactly a qualitative stopping rule is.
That question can be avoided entirely. Notice that our argument above showed
that, for the special class of stopping rules identified, if E and F “differ only” in
stopping rule, then P Eθ (ω) = P
F
θ (ω) for all θ and all ω that can be obtained in
both experiments. Then, it will also be the case that PMθ (〈E, ω〉) = P
M
θ (〈F, ω〉)
for all θ and all ω, where (1) M is the mixed experiment in which one flips a
fair coin to decide whether to conduct E or F and (2) the outcomes 〈E, ω〉 and
〈F, ω〉 of M are as defined above.
Thus, whatever a “stopping rule” is in the qualitative setting, we can define
two experiments to differ only in stopping rule (for the special class of stop-
ping rules we’ve identified) if 〈E, ω〉|θ ≡M 〈F, ω〉|θ for all θ and any outcome
ω obtainable in both experiments. By Corollary 1, if 〈E, ω〉|θ ≡M 〈F, ω〉|θ for
all θ, then 〈E, ω〉 and 〈F, ω〉 are posterior and favoring equivalent. Thus, by
the definition of “irrelevance” of stopping rule, knowledge of whether E or F
was conducted is irrelevant. It should be noted that, just as in the quantitative
case, a likelihoodist could also argue for the “irrelevance” of stopping rules by
appealing to the qualitative analog of lp−.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have shown that, just as ll and lp characterize when all Bayesian rea-
soners agree how evidence should alter one’s posterior probabilities, qualitative
likelihoodist theses like qll characterize agreement among agents whose beliefs
satisfy weak coherence requirements. Our work should be extended in at least
four ways.
First, one should characterize necessary conditions for qualitative posterior
equivalence; we have proven only that our qualitative analog of lp− is sufficient.
Second, our framework assumes the totality of the relation , but the most
plausible generalization of Bayesian reasoning models agents as having degrees
of beliefs that are not totally ordered but rather, are representable only by
“imprecise” probabilities (Walley, 1991). It is necessary to assess how many
of our results continue to hold when  is only a partial order and to see what
additional axioms might be appropriate in that case to secure the above results.
Third, we have assumed that the parameter space is finite. Assuming a
qualitative countable additivity assumption (Krantz et al., 2006b, p. 216), we
conjecture, will allow us to extend those results to countable spaces, but it is
unclear how to extend our framework to uncountable spaces.
Finally, Birnbaum (1962) began the exploration of the relationship between
lp and a variety of other evidential “axioms”, including the sufficiency, condi-
tionality, and invariance principles. The relationship between those additional
axioms should be explored in our qualitative framework.
A Appendices
A.1 Notation
Let Θ represent the possible values of an unknown parameter. For simplicity,
we assume Θ is finite. An experiment E will be represented by an ordered pair
〈ΩE, 〈P Eθ 〉θ∈Θ〉, where Ω
E represents the possible outcomes of the experiment
and each P Eθ is a probability measure over the power set algebra of Ω
E. We
assume ΩE is finite. The results below hold if the measures P Eθ are all defined
on some other algebra A over ΩE, but for simplicity, we will always consider the
power set algebra.
Given an experiment E, we let ∆E = Θ×ΩE. We use H1, H2 etc. to denote
subsets of Θ, and E,F , etc. to denote subsets of Ω. We drop the superscript E
when it is clear from context.
We use QE to denote a joint distribution on ∆E and will use the letter
Q (without a superscript) to denote the associated prior on Θ, i.e., Q(H) =
QE(H×ΩE). We assume an experimenter’s prior does not depend on the exper-
iment, and so given a prior Q over Θ and an experiment E = 〈ΩE, 〈P Eθ 〉θ∈Θ〉, we
can define a joint distribution on ∆E by QE(H × E) :=
∑
θ∈H,ω∈EQ(θ)P
E
θ (ω).
We will write QE(·|H) and QE(·|E) instead of QE(·|H ×Ω) and QE(·|Θ×E)
respectively, and similarly for events to the left of the conditioning bar. When
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the experiment E is clear from context, we occasionally drop the superscript E
on the letter Q.
A.2 LL+ is Equivalent to Bayesian Support
The following definition contains the central concept we use to characterize when
all Bayesians agree that one piece of evidence is better than another.
Definition 1. Suppose H1, H2 ⊆ Θ are disjoint. Let E and F be outcomes of
experiments E and F respectively. Say E Bayesian supports H1 over H2 at least
as much as F if QE(H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) ≥ QF(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) for all priors
Q for which QF(·|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) is well-defined. If the inequality is strict for all
such Q, then we say E Bayesian supports H1 over H2 strictly more than F . In
the former case, we write E BH1DH2F , and in the latter, we write E
B
H1
≫H2F .
The following claim links Bayesian support to ll+ by showing that E BH1DH2F
exactly when ll+ says that E provides stronger evidence for θ1 over θ2 than F
does.
Claim 1. Suppose H1 and H2 are finite and disjoint. Let E and F be outcomes
of experiments E and F respectively. Then E BH1DH2F if and only if (1) for all
θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2, if P
F
θ (F ) > 0, then P
E
θ (E) > 0, and (2) for all θ1 ∈ H1 and
θ2 ∈ H2:
P Eθ1(E) · P
F
θ2
(F ) ≥ P Eθ2(E) · P
F
θ1
(F ) (2)
Similarly, E BH1≫H2F if and only if the inequality in the above equation is always
strict.
Proof. In both directions, we will need the following basic arithmetic fact.
Observation 1: Suppose 〈aj〉j≤n, 〈bk〉k≤m, 〈cj〉j≤n, and 〈dk〉k≤m are sequences
of non-negative real numbers. Then aj · dk ≥ bk · cj for all j ≤ n and k ≤ m if
and only if
∑
j≤n rj · aj∑
j≤n rj · aj +
∑
k≤m sk · bk
≥
∑
j≤n rj · cj∑
j≤n rj · cj +
∑
k≤m sk · dk
(3)
for all sequences 〈rj〉j≤n and 〈sk〉k≤m of non-negative real numbers such that∑
j≤n rjaj +
∑
k≤m skbk and
∑
j≤n rjcj +
∑
k≤m skdk are both positive.
Proof: First, note that if 〈rj〉j≤n and 〈sk〉k≤m are sequences of non-negative
real numbers such that
∑
j≤n rjaj +
∑
k≤m skbk and
∑
j≤n rjcj +
∑
k≤m skdk
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are positive, then both sides of Equation 3 are well-defined and
Equation 3 holds ⇔

∑
j≤n
rjaj

 ·

∑
j≤n
rjcj +
∑
k≤m
skdk

 ≥

∑
j≤n
rjcj

 ·

∑
j≤n
rjaj +
∑
k≤m
skbk


Cross multiplying
⇔

∑
j≤n
rjaj

 ·

∑
k≤m
skdk

 ≥

∑
j≤n
rjcj

 ·

∑
k≤m
skbk


Cancelling common terms
⇔

 ∑
j≤n,k≤m
rjajskdk

 ≥

 ∑
j≤n,k≤m
rjcjskbk

 [Condition †]
Rules of double sums
Now we prove the right-to-left direction. Assume Equation 3 holds for all se-
quences of rjs and sks for which the sums specified above are positive. Pick
arbitrary j0 ≤ n and k0 ≤ m. Our goal is to show aj0dk0 ≥ cj0bk0 . Consider
the specific sequence of rj ’s and sk’s such that rj0 = sk0 = 1 and rj = sk = 0
for all j 6= j0 and k 6= k0. There are two cases two consider.
If
∑
j≤n rjaj +
∑
k≤m skbk and
∑
j≤n rjcj +
∑
k≤m skdk are both positive,
then Condition † holds and reduces to the claim aj0dk0 ≥ cj0bk0 , as desired.
If
∑
j≤n rjaj+
∑
k≤m skbk = aj0+bk0 and
∑
j≤n rjcj+
∑
k≤m skdk = cj0+dk0
are not both positive, then because all the a’s, b’s, etc. are non-negative, it
follows that either (i) aj0 = bk0 = 0 or (i) cj0 = dk0 = 0. In either case
aj0dk0 = 0 ≥ 0 = cj0bk0 .
The left-to-right direction merely reverses the direction of the above calcu-
lations. In greater detail, assume aj · dk ≥ bk · cj for all j ≤ n and k ≤ m.
Let 〈rj〉j≤n and 〈sk〉k≤m be sequences of non-negative real numbers such that∑
j≤n rjaj +
∑
k≤m skbk and
∑
j≤n rjcj +
∑
k≤m skdk are both positive. Our
goal is to show Equation 3 holds. By the reasoning above, it suffices to show
Condition † holds. Note that because aj ·dk ≥ bk · cj for all j ≤ n and k ≤ m by
assumption, every term in the sum on the left-hand-side of Condition † is greater
than the corresponding term on the right hand side. So † holds as desired.
(End Proof of Observation).
The central claim follows from Observation 1 by appropriate substitutions.
Specifically, enumerate H1 = {θ1,1, θ1,2, . . . θ1,n} and H2 = {θ2,1, θ2,2, . . . θ2,m}.
To apply the observation, let aj = P
E
θ1,j
(E), cj = P
F
θ1,j
(F ), bk = P
E
θ2,k
(E), and
dk = P
F
θ2,k
(F ). Those terms are clearly all non-negative. So Observation 1
entails that
P Eθ1,j (E) · P
F
θ2,k
(F ) = ajdk ≥ cjbk ≥ P
E
θ2,k
(E) · P Fθ1,j (F ) for all j, k (4)
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if and only if
∑
j≤n rj · P
E
θ1,j
(E)∑
j≤n rj · P
E
θ1,j
(E) +
∑
k≤m sk · P
E
θ2,k
(E)
≥
∑
j≤n rj · P
F
θ1,j
(F )∑
j≤n rj · P
F
θ1,j
(F ) +
∑
k≤m sk · P
F
θ2,k
(F )
(5)
for all sequences 〈rj〉j≤n and 〈sk〉k≤m of non-negative real numbers such that∑
j≤n rj ·P
E
θ1,j
(E)+
∑
k≤m sk·P
E
θ2,k
(E) and
∑
j≤n rj ·P
F
θ1,j
(F )+
∑
k≤m sk·P
F
θ2,k
(F )
are both positive.
Now, we prove the right-to-left direction of Claim 1. Suppose (1) for all
θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2, if P Fθ (F ) > 0, then P
E
θ (E) > 0, and (2) Equation 4 holds. Let
Q be some prior such that QF(·|F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) is well-defined. We claim
QE(·|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) is also well-defined. Why? Since Q
F(·|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)), we
have by definition that:
QF(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) =
∑
j≤nQ(θ1,j) · Pθ1,j (F )∑
j≤nQ(θ1,j) · P
F
θ1,j
(F ) +
∑
k≤mQ(θ2,k) · P
F
θ2,k
(F )
(6)
That fraction is well-defined only if the denominator is positive, i.e.,
∑
j≤n
Q(θ1,j) · P
F
θ1,j
(F ) +
∑
k≤m
Q(θ2,k) · P
F
θ2,k
(F ) > 0 (7)
Therefore, there is some θ ∈ H1∪H2 such that Q(θ)·P Fθ (F ) > 0. By assumption
(1), it follows that Q(θ) · P Eθ (E) > 0. Hence:∑
j≤n
Q(θ1,j) · P
E
θ1,j
(E) +
∑
k≤m
Q(θ2,k) · P
E
θ2,k
(E) > 0 (8)
from which it follows that QE(·|E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) is also well-defined. It thus
remains to be shown that QE(H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) ≥ QF(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)).
Letting rj = Q(θ1,j) and sk = Q(θ2,k), the inequalities in Equation 7 and
Equation 8 entail that
∑
j≤n rjaj+
∑
k≤m skbk and
∑
j≤n rjcj+
∑
k≤m skdk are
both positive. Since we’ve assumed (2) that Equation 4 holds, the left-to-right
direction of Observation 1 entails that Equation 5 must hold as desired.
In the left-to-right direction, suppose thatQE(H1|E∩(H1∪H2)) ≥ QF(H1|F∩
(H1 ∪H2)) for all priors Q for which QF(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) is well-defined. We
must show that (1) for all θ ∈ H1 ∪H2, if P Fθ (F ) > 0, then P
E
θ (E) > 0, and (2)
Equation 4 holds.
To show (1), suppose P Fθ (F ) > 0 for some υ ∈ H1 ∪ H2. Define Q so that
Q(υ) = 1. Then
QF(F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) =
∑
θ∈H1∪H2
Q(θ) · P Fθ (F ) = Q(υ) · P
F
υ (F ) = P
F
υ (F ) > 0 (9)
and so QF(·|F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) is well-defined. Thus, Q
E(H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) ≥
QF(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) by our assumption. Hence, QE(·|E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) is
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also well-defined, which entails QE(E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) > 0. But using the same
reasoning that lead to Equation 9, we obtain P Eυ (E) = Q
E(E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)), and
so P Eυ (E) > 0 as desired.
Next, we must show that Equation 4 holds. Since QE(H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) ≥
QF(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)), we make the same substitutions as in the left-to-right
direction and infer that Equation 5 holds. We then apply Observation 1 to
obtain that Equation 4 holds, as desired.
From this claim, we can derive an equivalence between what the notion of
“favoring” in the weak law of likelihood and what we call “Bayesian favoring.”
Recall, the weak law of likelihood (ll) says that P Eθ1(E) ≥ P
E
θ2
(E) if and only if
the data E (weakly) favors θ1 over θ2. Bayesian favoring is defined below.
Definition 2. Say E Bayesian favors H1 to H2 if E
B
H1
DH2Ω, where Ω is the
sure event. E strictly Bayesian favors H1 to H2 if E
B
H1
≫H2Ω.
Claim 2. E Bayesian favors H1 to H2 if and only if (1) Pθ(E) > 0 for all
θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2 and (2) Pθ1(E) ≥ Pθ2(E) for all θ1 ∈ H1 and θ2 ∈ H2. If
H1 = {θ1} and H2 = {θ2} are simple, E strictly Bayesian favors H1 to H2 if
and only if ll entails E favors H1 to H2.
Proof. This follows immediately from Claim 1, since the likelihood of Pθ(Ω) = 1
for all θ.
A.3 LP is Equivalent to Bayesian Posterior and Favoring
Equivalence
We now characterize lp in terms of Bayesian agreement.
Definition 3. E and F are Bayesian favoring equivalent if F BH1DH2E and
E BH1DH2F for all disjoint hypotheses H1 and H2.
Definition 4. Say E and F are Bayesian posterior equivalent if for all priors Q
(i) Q(·|E) is well-defined if and only if Q(·|F ) is well-defined, and (ii) Q(H |E) =
Q(H |F ) for all hypotheses H , whenever those conditional probabilities are well-
defined.
Claim 3. The following are equivalent: (1) lp entails E and F are evidentially
equivalent, (2) E and F are Bayesian posterior equivalent, (3) E and F are
Bayesian favoring equivalent.
Proof. First, we prove 1 ⇒ 2. Suppose there is a c > 0 such that P Eθ (E) =
c · P Fθ (F ). We must show E and F are posterior equivalent. To do so, we must
first show QE(·|E) is well-defined if and only if QF(·|F ) is. To do that, we must
show QE(E) is positive if and only if QF(F ) is.
By definition of QE, we have
QE(E) =
∑
θ∈Θ
Q(θ) · P Eθ (E). (10)
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Similarly,
QF(F ) =
∑
θ∈Θ
Q(θ) · P Fθ (F ) (11)
Since P Eθ (E) = c ·P
F
θ (F ) for some c > 0, each term in the sum in Equation 10 is
positive if and only if the corresponding term in the sum Equation 11 is positive.
Hence, QE(E) > 0 if and only if QF(F ) > 0, as desired.
The second thing we must show is that QE(H |E) = QF(H |F ) for all H ,
whenever those conditional probabilities are well-defined. To that end, let H ⊆
Θ be any (simple or composite) hypothesis. Then:
QE(H |E) =
QE(E ∩H)
QE(E)
definition of conditional probability
=
∑
θ∈H∩ΘQ
E(E ∩ {θ})∑
θ∈ΘQ
E(E ∩ {θ})
law of total probability
=
∑
θ∈H∩Θ P
E
θ (E) ·Q(θ)∑
θ∈Θ P
E
θ (E) ·Q(θ)
because Q(·|θ) = P Eθ (·) for all θ ∈ Θ and Q(θ) does not depend upon E
=
∑
θ∈H∩Θ c · P
F
θ (F ) ·Q(θ)∑
θ∈Θ c · P
F
θ (F ) ·Q(θ)
as P Eθ (E) = c · P
F
θ (F )
=
∑
θ∈H∩Θ P
F
θ (F ) ·Q(θ)∑
θ∈Θ P
F
θ (F ) ·Q(θ)
canceling c
= QF(H |F ) reversing the above steps
Next, we prove 2 ⇒ 1. Assume that, for all Q, we have (i) QE(·|E) is
well-defined if and only if QF(·|F ) is and (ii) QE(H |E) = QF(H |F ) for all non-
empty hypotheses H ⊆ Θ and all Q for which those conditional probabilities
are well-defined. We must find some c > 0 such that P Eθ (E) = c · P
F
θ (F ) for all
θ.
We first assume there is some θ ∈ Θ such that P Eθ (E) > 0 or P
F
θ (F ) > 0.
Otherwise, P Eθ (E) = P
F
θ (F ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, and so P
E
θ (E) = c · P
F
θ (F ) for all
c > 0 trivially.
So pick any υ ∈ Θ such that either P Eυ (E) > 0 or P
F
υ (F ) > 0. Without loss
of generality, assume that P Fυ (F ) > 0. We claim P
E
υ (E) > 0 as well. Why? Let
Q be the prior such that Q(υ) = 1. Then QF(F ) = Q(υ) · P Fυ (F ) = P
F
υ (F ) > 0.
Hence, QF(·|F ) is well-defined. Since E and F are posterior equivalent, QE(·|E)
is also well-defined. Because QF(E) = Q(υ) · P Eυ (E) = P
E
υ (E), it follows that
P Eυ (E) > 0 as desired.
Thus, if we let c = P Eυ (E)/P
F
υ (F ), it follows that c > 0. We want to show
that P Eθ (E) = c ·P
F
θ (F ) for all θ. It suffices, therefore, to show P
E
υ (E)/P
F
υ (F ) =
P Eθ (E)/P
F
θ (F ) for all θ.
To do so, let θ be arbitrary and now define Q to be any prior such that Q(υ)
and Q(θ) are both positive. Again, it’s easy to check that QE(·|E) and QF(·|F )
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are well-defined. So Bayes rule entails:
QE(θ|E)
QE(υ|E)
=
P Eθ (E)
P Eυ (E)
·
Q(θ)
Q(υ)
And similarly for F . By assumption, QE({θ}|E) = QE({θ}|F ), and hence:
P Eθ (E)
P Eυ (E)
·
Q(θ)
Q(υ)
=
P Fθ (F )
P Fυ (F )
·
Q(θ)
Q(υ)
It immediately follows that P Eυ (E)/P
F
υ (F ) = P
E
θ (E)/P
F
θ (F ) as desired.
Next we prove 2 ⇒ 3. Suppose that E and F are posterior equivalent. We
must show that QE(H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) = QF(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) for all disjoint
hypotheses H1, H2 ⊆ Θ and all Q for which those conditional probabilities are
well-defined.
To do so, let H1 and H2 be disjoint hypotheses, and let Q be a prior such
that QE(·|E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) and QF(·|F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) are both well-defined. It
follows that QE(E) and QF(F ) are both positive (since QE(E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) and
QF(F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) are). Since E and F are posterior equivalent, we can infer
that Q(H1|E) = Q(H1|F ) and Q(H2|E) = Q(H2|F ). Thus:
(Q(H1|E)·Q(E))·(Q(H2|F )·Q(F )) = (Q(H1|F )·Q(E))·(Q(H2|E)·Q(F )) (12)
We obtain the desired result via the following sequences of arithmetic operations:
Equation 12 holds ⇔
Q(E ∩H1) ·Q(F ∩H2) = Q(H1 ∩ F ) ·Q(E ∩H2)
⇔
Q(E ∩H1) ·Q(F ∩H2) +Q(E ∩H1) ·Q(F ∩H1) = Q(F ∩H1) ·Q(E ∩H2) +Q(E ∩H1) ·Q(F ∩H1)
⇔
Q(E ∩H1) · [Q(F ∩H1) +Q(F ∩H2)] = Q(F ∩H1) [Q(E ∩H1) +Q(E ∩H2)]
⇔
Q(E ∩H1)/ [Q(E ∩H1) +Q(E ∩H2)] = Q(F ∩H1)/ [Q(F ∩H1) +Q(F ∩H2)]
⇔
Q(H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) = Q(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) as H1 ∩H2 = ∅
Finally, we prove 3⇒ 2. Suppose E and F are Bayesian support equivalent.
We must show that E and F are Bayesian posterior equivalent, i.e., that (1)
Q(·|E) is well-defined if and only if Q(·|F ) is and (2) Q(H |E) = Q(H |F ) for
all hypotheses H and all Q for which those conditional probabilities are well-
defined.
To show (1), pick any H1 and H2 such that H1 ∪ H2 = Θ. If Q(·|E) is
well-defined, then Q(E) > 0, and note that Q(E) = Q(E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) because
H1 ∪H2 = Θ. Since E and F are Bayesian support equivalent, it follows that
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Q(F ) = Q(F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) ≥ Q(E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) > 0, and hence, Q(·|F ) is all
well-defined. Thus, we’ve shown that if Q(·|E) is well-defined, so is Q(·|F ). The
converse is proven in the exact same manner.
To show (2), let Q be any prior for which Q(·|E) and Q(·|F ) are well-defined.
Let H ⊆ Θ by some arbitrary hypothesis. We must show Q(H |E) = Q(H |F ).
Then define H1 = H and H2 = Θ \ H . Since E and F are Bayesian support
equivalent, we know that
Q(H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) = Q(H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2))
from which it follows that
Q(H |E) = Q(H1|E) = Q(H1|E∩ (H1∪H2)) = Q(H1|F ∩ (H1∪H2)) = Q(H |F )
as desired.
B Main Results
In this section, we prove generalizations of Claim 2 and Claim 3. Our results
apply in contexts in which an experimenter can justifiably order events in terms
of probability but may not be able to assign events precise numerical probabil-
ities. To do so, we represent experiment E by a pair 〈ΩE,⊑E〉 where, as before,
ΩE represents the set of possible experimental outcomes. The relation ⊑E is the
qualitative analog of the set of likelihood functions in an experiment. The idea
is that A|θ ⊑E B|η represents the claim that “experimental outcome B is at
least as likely under supposition η as outcome A is under supposition θ.” We
write A|B ≡E C|D if A|B ⊑E C|D and vice versa. We drop the superscript E
when it is clear from context.
In standard statistical contexts, one can use the measure Pθ to compare
conditional probabilities. For instance, if E,F, and G respectively represent the
events that at least six, seven, and eight heads are observed in a sequence of ten
tosses, then Pθ(E|F ) = 1 > Pη(G|F ) for any θ, η ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, we assume
that ⊑ is a binary relation on P(∆)× ((Θ×P(Ω)) \N⊑) (where P is the power
set operation) so that one can make comparisons of the form A|θ∩E ⊑ B|η∩F ,
where E,F ⊆ Ω are observable events, θ, η ∈ Θ are possible values of the
unknown parameter, and A,B ⊆ ∆ are arbitrary events. Here, members of N⊑
are the analog of probability zero events, which we cannot condition on. We
call members of N⊑ null sets.
Similarly, Bayesians assume that an experimenter’s beliefs are representable
by a probability function. We weaken that assumption and assume beliefs are
representable by an ordering  on P(∆) × (P(∆) \ N). Here, N is the
set of events the experimenter regards as having zero probability. We write
A|B ∼ C|D when A|B  C|D and vice versa.
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B.1 Important Lemmas
The following lemmas are copied from (Krantz et al., 2006a, p. 229), where
their proofs can be found.
Lemma 1. A|B  ∅|∆ whenever B 6∈ N .
Lemma 2. ∅|A ∼ ∅|B.
Lemma 3. If A ⊇ B, then A|C  B|C.
Lemma 4.
1. ∅ ∈ N ,
2. If A ∈ N , then ∆ \A 6∈ N .
3. If A ∈ N and B ⊆ A, then B ∈ N .
4. If A,B ∈ N , then A ∪B ∈ N .
In standard probability theory, calls an event “P -almost sure” if P (A) = 1.
By analogy, define:
Definition 5. An event A is called -almost sure if ∆\A ∈ N. Let S denote
the set of all -almost sure events.
As before, we drop the reference to the ordering  when it’s clear from
context.
Lemma 5. Let A ∈ S be an almost sure event. Then:
1. A 6∈ N
2. A ∩B 6∈ N for any B 6∈ N .
Proof. For brevity, we let ¬X abbreviate ∆ \X below.
[Part 1:] This is just a restatement of Part 2 of Lemma 4.
[Part 2:] Suppose for the sake of contradiction that A ∩ B ∈ N . By Part 2
of Lemma 4, since ¬A ∩ B ⊆ ¬A, it follows that ¬A ∩ B ∈ N . Since both
A ∩B and ¬A ∩ B are members of N , it follows from Part 4 of Lemma 4 that
(A ∩B) ∪ (¬A ∩B) ∈ N . However, (A ∩B) ∪ (¬A ∩B) = B, and so it follows
that B ∈ N , contradicting assumption.
In addition to Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we will frequently need to refer to ad-
ditional facts about null and almost-sure events. The first three parts of the
following lemma slightly strengthen (Krantz et al., 2006b, p. 230)’s Lemma 9.
The remaining parts of the are the lemma are analogous to facts from standard
probability theory that characterize when measure zero sets can be ignored,
and hence, when one can focus on the almost sure events. More precisely, in
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standard probability theory, if P (A) = 1, then (1) P (C|B) = P (C ∩ A|B) and
(2) P (C|B) = P (C|B ∩ A) whenever P (B) > 0. The last parts of the lemma
are the analog of those two facts.
We separate the following lemma from the previous ones since its proof uses
Axiom 6b. As we have said, (Krantz et al., 2006b, p. 230), prove the first parts
of the lemma, but in doing so, they use a “structural” axiom (specifically, what
they call Axiom 8) that requires the algebra of events to be sufficiently rich.
What we show is that similar facts can be derived from Axiom 6b, which poses
no constraint on the algebra of events itself.
Lemma 6.
1. If A ∈ N , then A|B ∼ ∅|∆ for all B 6∈ N .
2. If A ∈ N , then A|B ∼ ∅|C for all B,C 6∈ N .
3. If A ⊆ B and A|B  ∅|∆, then A ∈ N .
4. If A ∈ S, then A|A ∼ A|B for all B 6∈ N .
5. If A ∈ S, then C|B ∼ (A ∩C)|B for all B 6∈ N . Similarly, if A ∈ N , then
C|B ∼ C ∪ A|B for all B 6∈ N .
6. If A ∈ S, then C|B ∼ C|(B ∩A) for all B 6∈ N . Similarly, if A ∈ N , then
C|B ∼ C|B ∪ A for all B 6∈ N .
Proof. As before, for brevity, we let ¬X abbreviate ∆ \X below.
[Part 1:] Suppose for the sake of contradiction that A|B 6∼ ∅|∆. By Lemma 1,
A|B  ∅|∆, and thus, it follows from our supposition that A|B ≻ ∅|∆. By
Axiom 4, we obtain that A ∩ B|B ∼ A|B, and so by Axiom 1 (specifically,
transitivity), we get A ∩ B|B ≻ ∅|∆. By Lemma 2, ∅|B ∼ ∅|∆, and so by
Axiom 1 (specifically, transitivity), we get A ∩B|B ≻ ∅|B. Now define:
X = ∆ X ′ = ∆
Y = B Y ′ = B
Z = A ∩B Z ′ = ∅
Clearly, Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X and Z ′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ X ′. We’ve just shown that Z|Y ≻ Z ′|Y ′,
and since Y |X = Y ′|X ′, we have by Axiom 1 (specifically, reflexivity) that
Y |X  Y ′|X ′. Thus, Axiom 6b entails Z|X ≻ Z ′|X ′, i.e., that A|∆ ≻ ∅|∆.
But because A ∈ N , it follows from Axiom 2 that A|∆  ∅|∆, which is a
contradiction.
[Part 2:] Follows immediately from Part 1 and Lemma 2.
[Part 3:] Define:
X = ∆ X ′ = ∆
Y = B Y ′ = ∆
Z = A Z ′ = ∅
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Clearly, Z ′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ X ′. Because A ⊆ B, we also know Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X . By
assumption
Z|Y = A|B  ∅|∆ = Z ′|Y ′.
Further, since B ⊆ ∆, Lemma 3 entails Y |X = B|∆  ∆|∆ = Y ′|X ′. Thus,
Axiom 6b entails Z|Y  Z ′|X ′, i.e., that A|∆  ∅|∆. So by Axiom 2, it follows
that A ∈ N , as desired.
[Part 4:]. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that A|B 6∼ B|B. Since B 6∈ N ,
it follows from Axiom 1 (specifically, the totality of ) that either A|B ≺ B|B
or A|B ≻ B|B. By Axiom 3 and Axiom 4, we have A|B  ∆|B ∼ B|B.
Thus, A|B ≺ B|B. Since A ∈ S, by definition of S, we know ¬A ∈ N .
Hence, ¬A|B  ∅|B by Part 2 of this lemma. Since (1) A|B ≺ B|B and (2)
¬A|B  ∅|B, it follows from Axiom 5 that A∪¬A|B ≺ B|B. But A∪¬A = ∆,
and so we’ve shown ∆|B ≺ B|B. Since ∆|B ∼ B|B by Axiom 4, it follows that
B|B ≺ B|B, contradicting the Axiom 1 (specifically, the reflexivity of ).
[Part 5:] Since A ∈ S, we have ¬A ∈ N , and thus, by Part 3 of Lemma 4, we
have ¬A ∩ C ∈ N . Thus, ¬A ∩ C|B ∼ ∅|B by Part 2 of this Lemma. Since
(1) A ∩ C|B ∼ A ∩ C|B by Axiom 1 (specifically, the reflexivity of ) and (2)
¬A ∩ C|B ∼ ∅|B (as just shown), Axiom 5 entails:
C|B = (A ∩ C) ∪ (¬A ∩ C)|B ∼ (A ∩ C) ∪ ∅|B = A ∩ C|B
as desired.
To show the second claim, suppose A ∈ N so that ¬A ∈ S by definition.
Because ¬A ∈ S, what we’ve just shown entails both that C|B ∼ C ∩ ¬A|B
and that (C ∪ A)|B ∼ (C ∪ A) ∩ ¬A|B. Notice that C ∩ ¬A = (C ∪ A) ∩ ¬A,
and so by transitivity we get C|B ∼ C ∪ A|B as desired.
[Part 6:] Suppose for the sake of contradiction that C|B 6∼ C|(B ∩ A). By
assumption B 6∈ N , and so the left-hand-side is well-defined. The right-hand
side is also well-defined. Why? By assumption A ∈ S and B 6∈ N , and so
A ∩B 6∈ N by Lemma 5.
Since C|B 6∼ C|(B ∩ A) and both sides are well-defined, by Axiom 1, either
C|B ≻ C|(B ∩ A) or vice versa. Without loss of generality, assume the former.
Define:
X = ∆ X ′ = ∆
Y = B Y ′ = B ∩ A
Z = C ∩B Z ′ = C ∩B ∩A
By Axiom 4 and assumption, Z|Y ≻ Z ′|Y ′. Because A ∈ S, Part 5 of this
lemma entails Y |X = B|∆ ∼ Y ′|X ′ = (B ∩ A)|∆. So by Axiom 6b, it follows
that
Z|X ≻ Z ′|X ′ = (C ∩B ∩A)|∆.
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But again, by Part 4 of this lemma, Z ′|X ′ = (C∩B∩A)|∆ ∼ (C∩B)|∆ = Z|X .
So we’ve shown Z|X ≻ Z ′|X ′ and Z|X ∼ Z ′|X ′, which is a contradiction.
The second claim is proven in the same way as the second claim in Part
5.
The following lemma is the analog of the fact that, if P (C) > 0, then
P (A|C) ≤ P (B|C) if and only if P (A ∩ C) ≤ P (B ∩ C). For brevity, we
sometimes write X instead of X |∆ below.
Lemma 7. If X |Y W |Y , then X∩Y W ∩Y . The converse holds if Y 6∈ N .
Proof. To prove the left to right direction, we apply Axiom 6b. Let A = A′ = ∆;
B = B′ = Y ; C = X ∩ Y and C′ = W ∩ Y . Notice that C ⊆ B ⊆ A and
C′ ⊆ B′ ⊆ A′. Because A = A′ and B = B′, it immediately follows from the
reflexivity of  that B|A  B′|A′. Further:
C|B = X ∩ Y |Y by definition of C&B
∼ X |Y by Axiom 4
 W |Y by assumption
∼ W ∩ Y |Y by Axiom 4
= C′|B′ by definition of C′ and B′
So by Axiom 6b, it follows that C|A  C′|A′, i.e., that X ∩ Y |∆  W ∩ Y |∆,
i.e., that X ∩ Y W ∩ Y , as desired.
In the right to left direction, we prove the contrapositive. That is, suppose
that X |Y 6 W |Y . Because Y 6∈ N and the relation  is total (Axiom 1), it
follows that W |Y ≺ X |Y . From this, we immediately get that X ∩Y /∈ N . One
can then apply Axiom 6b in the same way we just did to show that W ∩ Y ≺
X ∩ Y (since X ∩Y /∈ N , we get the strict conclusion). By the definition of the
≺, it follows that X ∩ Y 6W ∩ Y , as desired.
The final important lemma is special case of Axiom 6a that we use frequently;
it’s proof relies on Axiom 6b in cases in which null sets are involved.
Lemma 8. Suppose A ⊇ B ⊇ C and A ⊇ B′ ⊇ C. If B|A  C|B′ and B 6∈ N ,
then B′|A  C|B. Further, if the antecedent is ≻, the consequent is ≻.
Proof. Assume A ⊇ B ⊇ C, A ⊇ B′ ⊇ C, and B|A  C|B′.
First note that if C ∈ N , then it follows from Lemma 6 that C|B ∼ ∅|∆.
Hence, by Lemma 1, we get B′|A  C|B. In this case, we also get the stronger
result that B′|A ≻ C|B without any further assumption. Why? Since by
hypothesis B|A  C|B′, the expression C|B′ is defined and B′ 6∈ N . Since
B′ ⊆ A, it follows from Part (3) of Lemma 6 that B′|A 6 ∅|∆. By Axiom 1
(specifically, totality), we obtain that B′|A ≻ ∅|∆ ∼ C|B as desired.
So suppose C 6∈ N . Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that B′|A 6 C|B.
Since B|A  C|B′, we know A 6∈ N and so the expression B|A is well-defined.
Further, B 6∈ N by assumption. Thus, if B′|A 6 C|B, it follows from by Axiom
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1 (specifically, totality of the ordering) that C|B ≻ B′|A. Now we apply Axiom
6a with A′ = A, C′ = C. We thus get C|A ≻ C′|A′ = C|A, which contradicts
the reflexivity of the weak ordering (i.e., Axiom 1). Thus, B′|A  C|B.
Finally, we must show that if the antecedent is strict (i.e., B|A ≻ C|B′),
then so is the conclusion (i.e., B′|A ≻ C|B). Again, we suppose for the sake
of contradiction that B′|A 6≻ C|B. Because A,B 6∈ N by the above reasoning,
it follows from by Axiom 1 (specifically, totality of the ordering), C|B  B′|A.
Again, we apply Axiom 6a with A′ = A and C′ = C to obtain C|A ≻ C|A,
which again contradicts the reflexivity of the weak ordering.
B.2 QLL and Qualitative Favoring
In this section, we aim to prove a qualitative analog of Claim 2. To do so, we
first state the definition of qualitative favoring and an analog of ll.
Definition 6. Given disjoint hypotheses H1 and H2, we say E qualitatively
supports H1 overH2 at least as much as F ifH1|E∩(H1∪H2)  H1|F∩(H1∪H2)
for all orderings  satisfying our axioms of qualitative conditional probability
and for which F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N. The support is said to be strict when  is
replaced with ≻.
By analogy to the quantitative case, we define “qualitative favoring” to be
a special case of qualitative support.
Definition 7. Given disjoint hypotheses H1 and H2, we say E qualitatively
favors H1 to H2 if E supports H1 over H2 at least as much as much as Ω. The
favoring is called strict when  is replaced with ≻.
We’ll show that qualitative favoring is equivalent to the notion axiomatized
by a qualitative form of the law of likelihood.
• Qualitative law of likelihood (qll): E favors θ1 to θ2 if E|θ2 ⊏ E|θ1.
Here is our first major result.
Theorem 1. Suppose H1 and H2 are finite. Then E qualitatively favors H1
over H2 if (1) ∅|θ ⊏ E|θ for all θ ∈ H1 ∪H2 and (2) E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for all θ1 ∈ H1
and θ2 ∈ H2. Under Assumption 1 (below), the converse holds as well. In both
directions, the favoring inequality is strict exactly when the likelihood inequality
is strict.
If H1 = {θ1} and H2 = {θ2} are simple, then E qualitatively favors H1 over
H2 if and only if qll entails so. No additional assumptions are required in this
case.
Assumption 1. For all orderings ⊑ satisfying the axioms above and for all
non-empty H ⊆ Θ, there exists an ordering  satisfying the axioms such that
(A) H ∈ S and (B) θ|∆ ≻ ∅|∆ for all θ ∈ H .
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We believe Assumption 1 is provable, but we have not yet produced a proof.
The assumption more-or-less says that one’s “prior” ordering over the hypothe-
ses is unconstrained by the “likelihood” relation ⊆. This is exactly analogous
to the quantitative case. In that case, a joint distribution QE on ∆ = Θ×ΩE is
determined (i) the measures 〈Pθ(·)〉θ∈Θ over Ω
E and (ii) one’s prior Q over Θ.
Although the joint distribution QE is constrained by 〈Pθ(·)〉θ∈Θ, one’s prior Q
on Θ is not, and so for any non-empty hypothesis H ⊆ Θ, one can define some
Q such that Q(H) = 1 and Q(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ H . That’s what the assumption
says.
The theorem follows from the following three propositions, which we prove
in the ensuing sections.
Proposition 1. Suppose E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) 6∈ N for all orderings satisfying the
axioms above and for which H1 ∪ H2 6∈ N. If Assumption 1 holds, then
∅|θ ⊏ E|θ for all θ ∈ H1 ∪H2.
Proposition 2. Suppose H1 ∩H2 = ∅.
1. Suppose E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N . If E|H1  E|H2, then H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 
H1|H1 ∪H2.
2. Suppose H1, H2 6∈ N . If H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)  H1|H1 ∪H2, then E|H1 
E|H2.
Further, if the antecedent of either conditional contains a strict inequality ≻,
then so does the consequent.
Proposition 3. Suppose H1 and H2 are finite and that H1 ∩ H2 = ∅. If
E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for all θ1 ∈ H1 and θ2 ∈ H2, then E|H2  E|H1 for all orderings 
(satisfying the axioms above) for which H1, H2 6∈ N . The converse holds under
Assumption 1. In both directions,  can be replaced by the strict inequality ≺
if and only if the ⊑ can be replaced by the strict relation ⊏.
Notice that the second proposition holds in both directions when H1 and
H2 are simple hypotheses by Axiom 0. The additional assumption is necessary
only if H1 and H2 are composite.
Proof of Theorem 1: We consider the right-to-left direction first. Suppose (1)
∅|θ ⊏ E|θ for all θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2 and (2) E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for all θ1 ∈ H1 and
θ2 ∈ H2. We must show E qualitatively favors H1 over H2. To do so, let
 be any ordering satisfying the axioms such that H1 ∪ H2 6∈ N . We must
show H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)  H1|H1 ∪ H2. To do so, we must first show that
E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) 6∈ N , so that the left-hand side of the last inequality is well-
defined. Since H1 ∪H2 is finite and not a member of N , it follows from Part 4
of Lemma 4 that there is some η ∈ H1 ∪H2 such that {η} 6∈ N . By assumption
(1) that ∅|θ ⊏ E|θ for all θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2, we know ∅|η ⊏ E|η in particular. By
Axiom 0 and the fact that {η} 6∈ N , we can infer ∅|η ≺ E|η. Lemma 7 then
entails that ∅ ∩ {η}|∆ ≺ E ∩ {η}|∆. So by Axiom 2, E ∩ {η} 6∈ N . Because
E ∩ {η} ⊆ E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N as desired.
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Now that we know E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N , we argue that H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 
H1|H1 ∪H2 via proof by cases. Since H1 ∪ H2 6∈ N , it follows from Lemma 4
that at least one of H1 and H2 is not a member of N . Thus, there are three
cases to consider: (A) Neither is in N , (B) H1 ∈ N but H2 6∈ N , and (C)
H2 ∈ N but H1 6∈ N .
Case A: Suppose H1, H2 6∈ N . By Proposition 3 and our first assumption
(that ∅|θ ⊏ E|θ for all θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2), it follows that E|H2  E|H1. Since
E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) 6∈ N and E|H2  E|H1, Part 1 of Proposition 2 allows us to
conclude that H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)  H1|H1 ∪H2, as desired.
Case B: SupposeH1 ∈ N butH2 6∈ N . SinceH1 ∈ N , Part 1 of Lemma 6 entails
both that H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∼ ∅|∆ and H1|H1∪H2 ∼ ∅|∆. By transitivity of ∼
(which follows from Axiom 1), we know that H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∼ H1|H1 ∪H2,
and hence, H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)  H1|H1 ∪H2 as desired.
Case C: Suppose H2 ∈ N but H1 6∈ N . First note that because H2 ∈ N , we
obtain that ¬H2 := ∆\H2 ∈ S by definition of S. Further, becauseH1∩H2 = ∅,
we know E ∩ H1 ⊆ H1 ⊆ ¬H2, and hence (E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)) ∩ ¬H2 = E ∩ H1.
Thus:
H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∼ H1|(E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)) ∩ ¬H2 by Part 6 of Lemma 6 since ¬H2 ∈ S
= H1|E ∩H1 as just shown
∼ E ∩H1|E ∩H1 by Axiom 4
∼ H1|H1 by Axiom 3
∼ H1|H1 ∪H2 by Part 6 of Lemma 6 since H2 ∈ N
In the left to right direction, suppose E qualitatively favors H1 over H2,
or in other words, H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)  H1|H1 ∪ H2 for all orderings  for
which H1∪H2 6∈ N. Further, suppose Assumption 1 holds. We must show (1)
∅|θ ⊏ E|θ for all θ ∈ H1 ∪H2 and (2) E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for all θ1 ∈ H1 and θ2 ∈ H2.
To show (1), recall we’ve assumed H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)  H1|H1 ∪ H2 for
all orderings  satisfying the axioms and for which H1 ∪ H2 6∈ N . Thus,
E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) 6∈ N for all orderings  satisfying the axioms and for which
H1 ∪H2 6∈ N . By Proposition 1 and Assumption 1, we’re done.
To show (2), recall we’ve assumed H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)  H1|H1 ∪H2 for all
orderings  for which H1∪H2 6∈ N . Thus, it is also the case theat H1|E∩(H1∪
H2)  H1|H1 ∪ H2 for all orderings  for which both H1 6∈ N and H2 6∈ N .
It follows from Part 2 of Proposition 2 that E|H2  E|H1 for all orderings 
for which both H1 6∈ N and H2 6∈ N . Proposition 3 then entails our desired
conclusion that E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for all θ1 ∈ H1 and θ2 ∈ H2.

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B.3 Proving Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1: By contraposition. Assume that it’s not the case that
∅|θ ⊏ E|θ for all θ. We show there is an ordering  satisfying the axioms such
that H1 ∪H2 6∈ N and E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N.
Because it’s not the case that ∅|θ ⊏ E|θ for all θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2, there exists
θ ∈ H1 ∪ H2 such that ∅|θ 6⊏ E|θ. By Axiom 2 (for ⊑), θ 6∈ N⊑ and so the
expression ·|θ is well-defined (with respect to ⊑). Since ∅|θ 6⊏ E|θ and ·|θ is
well-defined, it follows from Axiom 1 (specifically totality of ⊑) that E|θ ⊑ ∅|θ.
Using Assumption 1, pick any ordering  satisfying the axioms such that
(1) H = {θ} ∈ S and (2) θ|∆ ≻ ∅|∆. By 2 and Axiom 2, we know {θ} 6∈ N,
and since {θ} ⊆ H1∪H2, it follows from Part 3 of Lemma 4 that H1∪H2 6∈ N.
Because E|θ ⊑ ∅|θ, Axiom 0 entails that E|θ  ∅|θ. By Lemma 7, it follows
that E ∩ {θ}|∆  ∅|∆, and hence, E ∩ {θ} ∈ N by Axiom 2. By assumption,
{θ} ∈ S, and so ¬{θ} ∈ . Because E ∩ ¬{θ} ⊆ ¬{θ}, Part 3 of Lemma 4
allows us to conclude E ∩ ¬{θ} ∈ N . Because both E ∩ {θ} and E ∩ ¬{θ} are
null sets, Part 4 of Lemma 4 entails E = (E ∩¬{θ})∪ (E ∩{θ}) is in N . Again,
because E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ⊆ E and E ∈ N , we know from Part 3 of Lemma 4 that
E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N , and we’re done.

B.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 requires the following lemmas.
Lemma 9. Suppose H1 ∩H2 = ∅. If E|H1  E|H2, then E|H1  E|(H1 ∪H2).
The converse holds if H2 6∈ N . Further, if either side of the biconditional is ≻,
the other side is ≻ too.
Proof. In the left-to-right direction, assume that E|H1  E|H2, so thatH1, H2 6∈
N . Suppose, for the sake of contradiction that E|H1 6 E|(H1 ∪ H2). Since
H1 6∈ N , it follows from Lemma 4 (part 3) that H1 ∪ H2 6∈ N , and hence, the
expression ·|(H1 ∪H2) is well-defined. Since E|H1 6 E|(H1 ∪ H2), by totality
of  (part of Axiom 1), it follows that E|H1 ≺ E|(H1 ∪H2). By Axiom 4, we
get E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)|H1 ∪H2 ≻ E ∩H1|H1. We now apply Lemma 8 with:
A = H1 ∪H2
B = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) B
′ = H1
C = E ∩H1
Clearly, the necessary containment relations hold and we just showed B 6∈ N .
Since B|A ≻ C|B′, we get that B′|A ≻ C|B. So:
H1|H1 ∪H2 ≻ E ∩H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) (13)
Further, since E|H2  E|H1 and E|H1 ≺ E|(H1 ∪ H2), we know E|H2 ≺
E|H1 ∪H2. By similar reasoning as before (swapping H1, H2 in our application
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of Lemma 8), we can thus conclude that:
H2|H1 ∪H2 ≻ E ∩H2|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) (14)
We now apply Axiom 5 to equations (13) and (14). To do so, let
A = H1, A
′ = E ∩H1
B = H2, B
′ = E ∩H2
C = H1 ∪H2, C
′ = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
Note that A ∩ B = ∅ by our initial assumption that H1 ∩ H2 = ∅. From this,
it follows from A′ ∩ B′ = ∅. Now, Equation 13 says that A|C ≻ A′|C′ and
Equation 14 says that B|C ≻ B′|C′. Thus, we get that A ∪ B|C ≻ A′ ∪ B′|C′
by Axiom 5. In other words:
H1∪H2|H1∪H2 ≻ (E∩H1)∪(E∩H2)|E∩(H1∪H2) = E∩(H1∪H2)|E∩(H1∪H2)
(15)
This equation says that X |X ≻ Y |Y for two events X,Y . This contradicts
Axiom 3, so we get that E|H1  E|(H1 ∪H2), as desired.
Note that if E|H1 ≻ E|H2, Equation 13 would be , since we would get
E|H1  E|(H1 ∪ H2) from our initial steps. However, Equation 14 would still
be ≻, since E|H2 ≺ E|H1. And for Axiom 5, as long as either premise is ≻,
the conclusion is ≻. Thus, we would still reach a contradiction, and thus get
E|H1 ≻ E|(H1 ∪H2).
Now, for the right-to-left direction assume E|H1  E|(H1 ∪ H2) and that
H2 6∈ N . We want to show E|H1  E|H2.
Note that if E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) ∈ N , then since E ∩ Hi ⊆ E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) for
i = 1, 2, we know from Part 3 of Lemma 4 that E ∩Hi ∈ N . It follows that:
E|H1 ∼ E ∩H1|H1 by Axiom 4
∼ ∅|H2 by Part 2 of Lemma 6, since E ∩H1 ∈ N
∼ E ∩H2|H2 by Part 2 of Lemma 6E ∩H2 ∈ N
∼ E ∩H2|H2 by Axiom 4
and E|H1  E|H2 as desired.
Thus, assume that E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N , and define:
A = H1 ∪H2
B = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) B
′ = H1
C = E ∩H1
We use Lemma 8. Because C|B′  B|A (by Axiom 4) and we have assumed
that B = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N , we get that C|B  B′|A. This means that:
E ∩H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)  H1|H1 ∪H2 (16)
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Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that E|H1 6 E|H2. We know H1 6∈ N
(because E|H1  E|(H1 ∪ H2)) and we’ve simply assumed that H2 6∈ N for
this direction of the proof. Thus, both ·|H1 and ·|H2 are well-defined, and so
by the totality of  (part of Axiom 1), it follows that E|H2 ≻ E|H1. Because
E|H1  E|(H1∪H2), by transitivity we get E|H2 ≻ E|(H1∪H2). So if we apply
the same reasoning we did to derive Equation 16 (switching H1 and H2),we get
that:
E ∩H2|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ≻ H2|H1 ∪H2 (17)
Note that this comparison is strict as the premise was strict. From here, as in
the other direction of the proof, we use Axiom 5 to derive E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)|E ∩
(H1 ∪H2) ≻ H1 ∪H2|H1 ∪H2, contradicting Axiom 3 (the conclusion is strict
because at least one of the premises is strict). So we’ve shown E|H1  E|H2.
If our assumption contained a strict inequality (i.e., E|H1 ≻ E|(H1 ∪H2)),
then the only changes in the preceding argument would be that Equation 16
would be strict whereas Equation 17 would not. This would still lead to a
contradiction, and so in this case we would get E|H1 ≻ E|H2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose H1 ∩H2 = ∅.
[Part 1:] Suppose E|H1  E|H2 and that E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N . By Lemma 9, it
follows that E|H1  E|(H1 ∪H2). Applying Axiom 4, we get
E ∩H1|H1  E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)|H1 ∪H2 (18)
Define:
A = H1 ∪H2
B = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) B
′ = H1
C = E ∩H1
Note that Equation 18 says that C|B′  B|A and we’ve assumed that B =
E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N . So Lemma 8 tells us that C|B  B′|A, i.e.,
E ∩H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)  H1|H1 ∪H2
Applying Axiom 4 to the left-hand side of that inequality yields the desired
result. Note that if we had assumed E|H1 ≻ E|H2, then our conclusion would
contain ≻ because both Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 yield strict comparisons.
In the right to left direction, suppose H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)  H1|H1 ∪H2 and
that H1, H2 6∈ N . By Axiom 4:
H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
∼ H1 ∩E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
= E ∩H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
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So, we know E ∩ H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2)  H1|H1 ∪ H2. Now, we apply Lemma 8
again with:
A = H1 ∪H2
B = H1 B
′ = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
C = E ∩H1
The containment relations are satisfied; B = H1 6∈ N by assumption, and we
just showed C|B′  B|A. Thus, we get C|B  B′|A, i.e.,
E ∩H1|H1  E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)|(H1 ∪H2).
Applying Axiom 4 to both sides of the last inequality yields E|H1  E|H1∪H2.
So by Lemma 9 and the assumption that H2 6∈ N , we get E|H1  E|H2, as
desired. As before, if the premise were ≻, the conclusion would also be ≻
because the necessary lemmas would yield strict comparisons.
B.3.2 Proving Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 3 requires a few lemmata.
Lemma 10. Suppose H1 ∩ H2 = ∅. If E|H1 ∼ E|H2 then E|(H1 ∪ H2) ∼
E|H1 ∼ E|H2.
Proof. First note that if E|H1 ∼ E|H2, then H1, H2 6∈ N . Hence, H1 ∪H2 6∈ N
by Part 3 of Lemma 4. So expressions of the form ·|H1 ∪H2 are well-defined.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that E|(H1 ∪ H2) 6∼ E|H1 ∼ E|H2.
Since expressions of the form ·|H1 ∪H2 are well-defined, Axiom 1 (specifically
totality of the ordering), either E|(H1 ∪H2) ≺ E|H1 ∼ E|H2 or vice versa. We
thus consider two cases below.
In both cases, we use the fact that E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N . We can prove that
by contradiction as follows. Suppose that E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N . Then by Part 3
of Lemma 4, we know that E ∩H1 ∈ N since E ∩H1 ⊆ ∩(H1 ∪H2). Hence:
E|H1 ∪H2 ∼ E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)|H1 ∪H2 by Axiom 4
∼ ∅|H1 by Part 2 of Lemma 6 since E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N
∼ E ∩H1|H1 by Part 2 of Lemma 6 since E ∩H1 ∈ N
∼ E|H1 by Axiom 4
which contradictions our assumption that E|(H1 ∪H2) 6∼ E|H1.
We now consider the two cases discussed above.
Case 1: Suppose E|(H1 ∪H2) ≺ E|H1 ∼ E|H2. Define:
A = H1 ∪H2,
B = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2), B
′ = H2
C = E ∩H2
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Then C|B′ ≻ B|A by assumption of the case and Axiom 4. We also showed
B = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N above. So by Lemma 8 we have C|B  B′|A, i.e.,
H2|H1 ∪H2 ≺ E ∩H2|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
Analogous reasoning shows that
H1|H1 ∪H2 ≺ E ∩H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
Together, those two equation and Axiom 5 yields that
H1 ∪H2|H1 ∪H2 ≺ E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2).
But this contradicts Axiom 3.
Case 2: Suppose E|H2 ∼ E|H1 ≺ E|(H1∪H2). We get a similar contradiction.
Define:
A = H1 ∪H2,
B = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2), B
′ = H1
C = E ∩H1
Then C|B′ ≻ B|A by Axiom 4 and assumption of the case. We showed B =
E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N above. By Lemma 8 we have C|B  B′|A, i.e.,
H1|H1 ∪H2 ≺ E ∩H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
Analogous reasoning shows:
H2|H1 ∪H2 ≺ E ∩H2|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
Together, those two equation and Axiom 5 yields that
H1 ∪H2|H1 ∪H2 ≺ E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2).
But this contradicts Axiom 3.
Lemma 11. Suppose H1 ∩H2 = ∅.
a.) If E|H1, E|H2  E|H3, then E|(H1 ∪H2)  E|H3.
b.) If E|H3  E|H1, E|H2, then E|H3  E|(H1 ∪H2).
If the premise is not strict AND E|H1 ∼ E|H2, then the conclusion is not strict.
Otherwise, the conclusion is strict.
Proof. We first prove a). By totality of  (which is part of Axiom 1), one of
the following three cases must hold:
1. E|H2 ≺ E|H1,
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2. E|H1 ≺ E|H2,
3. E|H1 ∼ E|H2,
If the first case holds, then Lemma 9 entails E|(H1 ∪ H2) ≺ E|H1. Hence,
Axiom 1 (transitivity) and the assumption that E|H1, E|H2  E|H3 together
entail that E|(H1 ∪H2) ≺ E|H3.
If the second case holds, we reason analogously to show E|(H1 ∪ H2) ≺
E|H2 ≺ E|H3.
If the third case holds, then Lemma 10 entails that E|(H1 ∪H2) ∼ E|H1 
E|H3, and we’re done. Note that in the first two cases the conclusion is always
strict. And even in this case, if E|H1 ∼ E|H2 ≺ E|H3, the conclusion would be
strict.
The proof of part b) is analogous to a).
We’re now read to prove the main proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the right-to-left direction, suppose E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for
all θ1 ∈ H1 and θ2 ∈ H2. We want to show E|H2  E|H1 for all orderings 
for which H1, H2 6∈ N . So let  be any such ordering.
We show E|H2  E|H1 by induction on the maximum of the number of
elements in H1 or H2.
In the base case, suppose both H1 = {θ1} and H2 = {θ2} both have one
element. Then by Axiom 0 and the assumption that H1, H2 6∈ N , it immediately
follows that E|H2  E|H1.
For the inductive step, suppose the result holds for all natural numbers
m ≤ n, and assume that H1 = {θ1,1, . . . θ1,k} and H2 = {θ2,1 . . . , θ2,l} where
either k or l (or both) is equal to n+1. Define H ′1 = {θ1,1} and H
′′
1 = H1 \H
′
1,
and similarly, define H ′2 = {θ2,1} and H
′′
2 = H2 \ H
′
2. Then H
′
1, H
′′
1 , H
′
2, and
H ′′2 all have fewer than n elements, and by assumption, E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for all
θ2 ∈ H ′2, H
′′
2 and all θ1 ∈ H
′
1, H
′′
1 . Suppose, for the moment, that H
′
1, H
′′
1 , H
′
2,
and H ′′2 are all non-null. Then by inductive hypothesis, it would follow that
E|H ′1, E|H
′′
1  E|H
′
2, E|H
′′
2 . By repeated application of Lemma 11, it follows
that E|H1 = E|(H ′1 ∪H
′′
1 )  E|(H
′
2 ∪H
′′
2 ) = E|H2.
If any of H ′1, H
′′
1 , H
′
2, and H
′′
2 are members of N , the proof involves only a
small modification. Not that since H1 6∈ N and H1 = H ′1 ∪ H
′′
1 , at least one
of H ′1 and H
′′
1 must be non-null by Part 4 of Lemma 4. Suppose, without lost
of generality, that H ′1 ∈ N but H
′′
1 6∈ N . Then by Part 6 of Lemma 6, we get
E|H1 = E|H ′1 ∪ H
′′
1 ∼ E|H
′′
1 and the inductive hypothesis already applies to
H ′′1 because it contains fewer than n elements. Similar, reasoning apply to H2.
Note that if the premise were ⊏, Axiom 0 would prove the strict version
of the base case. In the inductive step, every inequality would also be strict
because Lemma 11 preserves the strictness. Thus, we would get E|H2 ≺ E|H1.
In the left-to-right direction, we proceed by contraposition. Suppose that
Assumption 1 holds and that it’s not the case that E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for all θ1 ∈ H1
and θ2 ∈ H2. We construct an ordering  such that H1, H2 6∈ N and E|H2 6
E|H1.
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To do so, note that because it’s not the case that E|θ2 ⊑ E|θ1 for all θ1 ∈ H1
and θ2 ∈ H2, we can fix θ1 ∈ H1 and θ2 ∈ H2 for which E|θ2 6⊑ E|θ1. By totality
of ⊑ (which is part of Axiom 1), it immediately follows that E|θ1 ⊏ E|θ2.
Using Assumption 1 with H = {θ1, θ2}, define  so that it satisfies all of the
axioms and:
θ1|∆, θ2|∆ ≻ ∅|∆
A|∆ ∼ ∅|∆ if θ1, θ2 6∈ A
Because θ1|∆, θ2|∆ ≻ ∅|∆, Axiom 2 entails that {θ1}, {θ2} 6∈ N . Since
{θ1}, {θ2} 6∈ N and E|θ1 ⊏ E|θ2, by Axiom 0 we obtain that E|θ1 ≺ E|θ2.
Now consider H ′1 = H1 \ {θ1} and H
′
2 = H2 \ {θ2}. Since H1 and H2 are
disjoint, neither H ′1 nor H
′
2 contain either θ1 or θ2. Thus by construction of ,
it follows that H ′1, H
′
2 ∈ N . So by Part 6 of Lemma 6, we obtain that
E|H1 = E|H
′
1 ∪ {θ1} ∼ E|θ1 and
E|H2 = E|H
′
2 ∪ {θ2} ∼ E|θ2
Since E|θ1 ≺ E|θ2, it follows that E|H1 ≺ E|H2, as desired.
If the premise were≺, the conclusion would clearly be ⊏, by simply swapping
all strict and weak inequalities in the preceding argument.
B.4 A Qualitative Likelihood Principle
We start with analogs of Bayesian favoring and posterior equivalence.
Definition 8. E and F are qualitative favoring equivalent if E qualitatively
supports H1 to H2 at least as much as F and vice versa, for any two disjoint
hypotheses H1 and H2. This means that, for all disjoint H1, H2, and for all 
we have (1) E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N if and only if F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N, and (2) if
E ∩ (H1 ∪H2), F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) 6∈ N, then
H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∼ H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
Definition 9. E and F are qualitative posterior equivalent if for any ordering
 satisfying the axioms: (1) E /∈ N if and only if F /∈ N and (2) H |E ∼ H |F
for any H ⊆ Θ whenever E /∈ N and F /∈ N .
We start by showing that these two definitions are equivalent.
Claim 4. E and F are qualitative posterior equivalent if and only if they are
qualitative favoring equivalent.
Proof. In the right to left direction, assume E and F are qualitative favoring
equivalent. We must show that E and F are posterior equivalent, i.e., for all
orderings satisfying the above axioms (1) E ∈ N if and only if F ∈  and (2)
H |E ∼ H |F for any hypothesis H ⊆ Θ whenever E,F 6∈ . So let  be an
arbitrary ordering and H ⊆ Θ be an arbitrary hypothesis. Define H1 = H and
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H2 = Θ \H . Notice that H1 and H2 are disjoint and H1 ∪H2 = Θ is the entire
space. We’ll now proceed to prove both 1 and 2.
To show 1, note that E = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) and F = F ∩ (H1 ∪H2). Since E
and F are qualitatively favoring equivalent, it follows that E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N
if and only if F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N , from which it follows that E ∈ N if and only
if F ∈ N as desired.
To show the 2, again note that by qualitative favoring equivalence and tran-
sitivity, we get
H |E = H1|E = H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∼ H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) = H1|F = H |F
In the left to right direction, assume that E and F are qualitatively posterior
equivalent. Let H1 and H2 be disjoint hypotheses, and let  be an ordering
satisfying the axioms above. We must show that (1) E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N if and
only if F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) and (2) H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∼1 |F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) whenever
both sides of that expression are well defined.
To show 1, notice that if either E or F is in N , then because E and F
are posterior equivalent, so is the other. Because E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) ⊆ E and
F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ⊆ F , it would then follow from Part 3 of Lemma 4 entails that
E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2), F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) ∈ N . Thus, if either E or F is in N , then
E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) if and only if F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N .
So consider the case in which neither E nor F is a member ofN , and thus, the
expressions ·|E and ·|F are well-defined. We’ll show that if E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ∈ N ,
then F ∩(H1∪H2); the converse is proved identically. If E∩(H1∪H2) ∈ N , then
both E∩H1 ∈ N and E∩H2 ∈ N by Part 3 of Lemma 4 since E∩H1, E∩H2 ⊆
E ∩ (H1 ∪H2). Therefore:
∅|E ∼E ∩H1|E by Part 2 of Lemma 6 and as E ∩H1 ∈ N
∼H1|E by Axiom 4
∼H1|F since E&F are posterior equivalent and E,F 6∈ N
∼F ∩H1|F by Axiom 4
Thus, ∅|E ∼ F ∩H1|F and so F ∩H1 ∈ N by Part 2 of Lemma 6. By identical
reasoning, F∩H2 ∈ N . By Part 4 of Lemma 4, it follows that F ∩(H1∪H2) ∈ N
as desired.
Now we show 2, i.e., if E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2), F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) 6∈ N , then H1|E ∩
(H1 ∪ H2) ∼ H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that
H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) 6∼ H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2). By Axiom 1, we obtain that either
H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ≺ H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) or vice versa. Without loss of generality,
assume
H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) ≺ H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) (19)
Since E ∩ (H1 ∪ H2), F ∩ (H1 ∪ H2) 6∈ N , it follows from Part 3 of Lemma 4
that E,F 6∈ N . Because E and F are posterior equivalent, we know that
H1 ∪H2|E ∼ H1 ∪H2|F. (20)
Define:
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A = F A′ = E
B = F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) B′ = E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
C = F ∩H1 C′ = E ∩H1
Thus:
B|A = F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)|F
∼ H1 ∪H2|F by Axiom 4
∼ H1 ∪H2|E by Equation 20
∼ E ∩ (H1 ∪H2)|E by Axiom 4
= B′|A′
Further:
C|B = F ∩H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
= H1 ∩ (F ∩ (H1 ∪H2))|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2)
∼ H1|F ∩ (H1 ∪H2) by Axiom 4
≻ H1|E ∩ (H1 ∪H2) by Equation 19
∼ C′|B′ reversing the above steps
Note that since C|B ≻ C′|B′, we know that C /∈ N . Further, since B|A ∼ B′|A′,
Axiom 6b entails C|A ≻ C′|A′, i.e., that F ∩H1|F ≻ E∩H1|E. But then Axiom
4 entails H1|F ≻ H1|E, and that contradicts the assumption that E and F are
qualitative posterior equivalent. Thus, by contradiction, E and F are qualitative
favoring equivalent.
Now, we prove that a qualitative analog of lp is a sufficient condition for
qualitative favoring/posterior equivalence. To do so, we first introduce the def-
inition of conditional independence.
Definition 10. For any C 6∈ N , the events A and B are said to be conditionally
independent given C if A|B ∩ C ∼ A|C or B ∩ C is null. In this case, we write
A ⊥C B.
Lemma 12. If A ⊥C B, then B ⊥C A.
Proof. Suppose A ⊥C B. There are two cases to consider: 1. A|B∩C ∼ A|C or
2. B ∩C ∈ N . If A∩C ∈ N , then B ⊥C A by definition. So for the remainder
of the proof we assume A ∩ C 6∈ N .
Case 1: Suppose A|B ∩ C ∼ A|C (so that B ∩ C 6∈ N ). Define:
X = C
Y = A ∩ C Y ′ = B ∩ C
Z = A ∩B ∩ C
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Since B ∩ C 6∈ N , we can condition on it and reason as follows:
Z|Y ′ = A ∩B ∩ C|B ∩ C
∼ A|B ∩ C by Axiom 4
∼ A|C by assumption of case
∼ A ∩ |C by Axiom 4
= Y |X
Lemma 8 then immediately entails that Y ′|X ∼ Z|Y since Y = A ∩ C 6∈ N .
But notice that Axiom 4 entails both that Y ′|X = B ∩ C|C ∼ B|C and that
Z|Y = A ∩ B ∩ C|A ∩ C ∼ B|A ∩ C. Thus, we obtain B|C ∼ B|A ∩ C, and
B ⊥C A as desired.
Case 2: Suppose B ∩C ∈ N . We show that (1) B|C ∼ ∅|C and (2) B|A∩C ∼
∅|C. Thus, we obtain B|C ∼ B|A ∩ C, and B ⊥C A as desired. To show 1,
note:
B|C ∼ B ∩ C|C by Axiom 4
∼ ∅|C by Part 2 of Lemma 6 as B ∩ C ∈ N
To show 2, note that A ∩ C 6∈ N , and so we can condition on it. Thus:
B|A ∩ C ∼ A ∩B ∩ C|A ∩C by Axiom 4
 ∅|A ∩ C by Part 3 of Lemma 4 as A ∩B ∩ C ⊆ B ∩ C ∈ N
∼ ∅|C by Part 2 of Lemma 6
Theorem 2. Let {Cθ}θ∈Θ be events such that
1. E|θ ≡ F ∩ Cθ|θ for all θ ∈ Θ,
2. F ⊥ θ Cθ with respect to ⊑ for all θ ∈ Θ,
3. Cθ|θ ≡ Cη|η for all θ, η ∈ Θ.
4. ∅|θ ⊏ Cθ|θ for all θ.
If Θ is finite, then E and F are qualitatively posterior and favoring equivalent.
This theorem follows from the following three propositions.
Proposition 4. If conditions 1, 2, and 4 of Theorem 2 hold, then E ∈ N if
and only if F ∈ N.
Proposition 5. Suppose E|θ ∼ F ∩Cθ|θ for all θ ∈ Θs ⊆ Θ. If Θs is finite and
E,F 6∈ N , then for all θ ∈ Θs:
θ|E ∼ F ∩ Cθ ∩ θ|
⋃
η∈Θs
F ∩ Cη ∩ η.
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Proposition 6. Suppose that F ⊥ θ Cθ with respect to , that Cθ|θ ∼ Cη|η,
and that F ∩ θ /∈ N for all θ, η ∈ ΘF ⊆ Θ. If ΘF is finite, then for all θ ∈ ΘF :
θ|F ∼ F ∩ Cθ ∩ θ|
⋃
η∈ΘF
F ∩ Cη ∩ η.
Proof of Theorem 2. The first proposition shows that ·|E is well-defined if and
only if ·|F is, so the first condition of qualitative posterior equivalence is satisfied.
Let Θs be the set of θ /∈ N, and let ΘF be the set of all F ∩ θ /∈ N (notice
that ΘF ⊆ Θs). We claim that θ|E ∼ θ|F , for all θ ∈ Θ. We go by cases.
Case 1: θ /∈ Θs. Then, θ ∈ N by definition. This means that θ|E ∼ ∅|E ∼
∅|F ∼ θ|F .
Case 2: θ ∈ Θs \ ΘF . Then, F ∩ θ ∈ N , so θ|F ∼ ∅. We claim that θ|E ∼ ∅
as well. To see why, note that, for all η ∈ Θs, we get that E|η ∼ F ∩Cη|η, from
condition 1 of the theorem and Axiom 0. Thus, we can apply Proposition 5 to
θ and Θs, yielding:
θ|E ∼ F ∩ Cθ ∩ θ|
⋃
η∈Θs
F ∩ Cη ∩ η (21)
Now, since F ∩ θ ∈ N , it follows from Lemma 4 that F ∩ Cθ ∩ θ ∈ N . So,
θ|E ∼ ∅, completing this case.
Case 3: θ ∈ ΘF . This implies that θ ∈ Θs as well; thus, Equation 21 remains
true. Now, for all θF , ηF ∈ ΘF , we get that F ∩ θF /∈ N , that F ⊥ θF CθF with
respect to , and that CθF |θF ∼ CηF |ηF . We thus apply Proposition 6 to θ and
ΘF , yielding:
θ|F ∼ F ∩Cθ ∩ θ|
⋃
η∈ΘF
F ∩ Cη ∩ η (22)
Now, for any θs ∈ Θs \ΘF , we know that F ∩ Cθs ∩ θ ∈ N , and thus applying
Part 6 of Lemma 6 to Equation 22, we get θ|F ∼ F ∩Cθ ∩ θ|
⋃
η∈Θs
F ∩Cη ∩ η.
Along with Equation 21, this means that θ|E ∼ θ|F .
Now, one can repeatedly apply Axiom 5 over the constituent simple hypothe-
ses in any H to get H |E ∼ H |F , showing that E and F are qualitative posterior
equivalent. With Claim 4, we also get qualitative favoring equivalence.
Before getting to the proofs of the propositions, we first prove the following
corollary to Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. If Θ is finite and E|θ ≡ F |θ for all θ ∈ Θ, then E and F are
qualitatively posterior and favoring equivalent.
Proof. We simply apply Theorem 2 with Cθ = ∆ for all θ. To see that the
conditions holds:
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1. Note that, for any θ, E|θ ≡ F |θ implies that E|θ ≡ F ∩∆|θ, since F ∩∆ =
F .
2. Similarly, F ⊥ θ ∆, since F |∆ ∩ θ ≡ F |θ, since ∆ ∩ θ = θ.
3. We have to show ∆|θ ≡ ∆|η for all θ, η ∈ Θ. Note that by Axiom 4,
∆|θ ∼ ∆ ∩ θ|θ = θ|θ. By Axiom 3, θ|θ ∼ η|η. Applying Axiom 4 again
shows that η|η ∼ ∆|η, so by transitivity, ∆|θ ∼ ∆|η. By Axiom 0, we get
that ∆|θ ≡ ∆|η, as desired.
4. ∆|θ ⊐ ∅|θ by Axiom 2.
From these conditions and the fact that Θ is finite, we get that E and F are
qualitatively posterior and favoring equivalent.
B.4.1 Proof of Proposition 4
We prove two short lemmata first. The first is the qualitative analog of the fact
that, if P (B ∩ C) > 0, then P (A ∩B|C) = 0 if and only if P (A|B ∩ C) = 0.
Lemma 13. Suppose B∩C 6∈ N . Then A∩B|C ∼ ∅|D if and only if A|B∩C ∼
∅|D for all D 6∈ N .
Proof. Since B ∩ C 6∈ N , we know C 6∈ N by Part 3 of Lemma 4. Thus:
A ∩B|C ∼ ∅|D ⇔ A ∩B|C ∼ ∅|C by Part 2 of Lemma 6 since C 6∈ N
⇔ A ∩B ∩ C|∆ ∼ ∅|∆ by Lemma 7
⇔ A|B ∩C ∼ ∅|B ∩ C by Lemma 7 since B ∩C 6∈ N
⇔ A|B ∩C ∼ ∅|D by Part 2 of Lemma 6 since D 6∈ N
Lemma 14. Suppose A ⊥C B and ∅|C ≺ B|C. Then A ∩ B|C ∼ ∅|C if and
only if A|C ∼ ∅|C.
Proof. The right to left direction follows immediately from Part 3 of Lemma 4
since A ∩B ⊆ A.
In the left to right direction, first note that B ∩C|C ∼ B|C by Axiom 4 and
that B|C ≻ ∅|C by assumption. Thus, B ∩ C|C ≻ ∅|C, from which it follows
that B ∩ C 6∈ N . Thus:
A ∩B|C ∼ ∅|C ⇔ A|B ∩ C ∼ ∅|C by Lemma 13 since B ∩ C 6∈ N
⇔ A|C ∼ ∅|C since A ⊥C B
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Proof of Proposition 4: Let’s first show that if E is a member of N, then so
is F . The proof of the converse is nearly identical because the lemmata we use
are all biconditionals.
Suppose E ∈ N. Thus, E ∩ {θ} ∈ N for all θ by Part 3 of Lemma 4, as
E ∩ {θ} ⊆ E. So by Axiom 2, it follows that E ∩ {θ}|∆ ∼ ∅|∆. Thus, for all θ
such that {θ} 6∈ N, we obtain that E|θ ∼ ∅|θ by Lemma 7.
Fix any arbitrary υ ∈ Θ such that {υ} 6∈ N. Below we’ll show F |υ ∼ ∅|υ.
This will suffice to show F ∈ N by the following reasoning. Since F |υ ∼ ∅|υ,
Lemma 7 entails that F ∩ {υ}|∆ ∼ ∅|∆. Since υ was arbitrary, it follows that
F ∩ {θ}|∆ ∼ ∅|∆ for all θ such that {θ} 6∈ N. Since Θ is finite by assumption,
it follows from Axiom 5 that F ∩H |∆ ∼ ∅|∆ where H = {θ ∈ Θ : {θ} 6∈ N}.
Because Θ is finite, it’s clear that ¬H := {θ ∈ Θ : {θ} ∈ N} is itself a member
of N, and hence, H ∈ S is an almost-sure event. Thus, by Part 5 of Lemma 6,
we obtain that F ∩H |∆ ∼ F |∆, and so F |∆ ∼ ∅|∆. Thus, by Axiom 2, F ∈ N
as desired.
Now we show that F |υ ∼ ∅|υ any arbitrary υ ∈ Θ such that {υ} 6∈ N, as
we claimed. Above, we showed that E|υ ∼ ∅|υ. From Axiom 0, it follows that
E|υ ≡ ∅|υ. By the first assumption of the proposition, we know E|υ ≡ F ∩Cυ|υ.
Thus, F ∩ Cυ |υ ≡ ∅|υ. From our assumptions that F ⊥υ Cυ and the fact
Cυ|υ ⊐ ∅|υ, Lemma 14 allows us to infer that F |υ ≡ ∅|υ. Since {υ} 6∈ N, we
can then apply Axiom 0 to conclude F |υ ∼ ∅|υ, as desired.
The proof of the converse simply reverses the direction of all the inferences
above. That is, if we assume F ∈ N, we can argue just as above that F |θ ∼ ∅|θ
for all θ such that {θ} 6∈ N . From there, we use Lemma 14 to argue F ∩Cθ |θ ∼
∅|θ for all non-null θ. By the assumptions of the proposition, that entails E|θ ∼
∅|θ for all non-null θ. By Lemma 7 and additivity, we can argue that E|∆ ∼ ∅|∆,
and hence, E ∈ N as desired.
B.4.2 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of Proposition 5 requires a few lemmata.
Lemma 15. Suppose B1, . . . , Bn partition G. If Ai|Bi ∼ Ci|Bi for all i ≤ n,
then ⋃
i≤n
Ai ∩Bi|G ∼
⋃
i≤n
Ci ∩Bi|G for all i ≤ n
Proof. We first use Lemma 7 on the premise, which yields Ai∩Bi|∆ ∼ Ci∩Bi|∆
for all i ≤ n. Applying Axiom 5 n times yields
⋃
i≤n Ai∩Bi|∆ ∼
⋃
i≤n Ci∩Bi|∆.
Because B1, . . . , Bn partition G, this is equivalent to G ∩
⋃
i≤nAi ∩ Bi|∆ ∼
G∩
⋃
i≤n Ci ∩Bi|∆. Finally, we apply Lemma 7 again to get the desired result
(note that G /∈ N since Bi /∈ N by the fact that Ai|Bi ∼ Ci|Bi).
The following lemma is the qualitative analog of the fact that, if P (B) > 0,
then P (A|B) = 0 if and only if P (A∩B) = 0. It is similar in spirit to Lemma 13.
Lemma 16. If A|B ∼ ∅|∆, then A ∩ B|C ∼ ∅|∆ for all C 6∈ N . The converse
holds if B 6∈ N .
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Proof. In the left to right direction, suppose A|B ∼ ∅|∆, and let C 6∈ N be
arbitrary. We want to show A ∩B|C ∼ ∅|∆. By Part 2 of Lemma 6, we know
∅|∆ ∼ ∅|B, and so A|B ∼ ∅|B by transitivity. Lemma 7 then entails that
A ∩ B|∆ ∼ ∅|∆, from which it follows that A ∩ B ∈ N . Hence, by Part 2 of
Lemma 6, A ∩B|C ∼ ∅|∆, as desired.
In the right to left direction, suppose B 6∈ N and that A∩B|C ∼ ∅|∆ for all
C 6∈ N . Then letting C = ∆, we obtain that A∩B|∆ ∼ ∅|∆. Thus, A∩B ∈ N ,
and Part 2 of Lemma 6 entails that A ∩B|B ∼ ∅|∆. Axiom 4 then entails that
A|B ∼ ∅|∆, as desired.
The next lemma outlines conditions under which we can “add” two quali-
tative equations by unioning the conditioning events. We will use this in the
proof of Lemma 18.
Lemma 17. Suppose Y ∩ Y ′ = Z ∩ Z ′ = ∅ and that X |Y ∼W |Z and X |Y ′ ∼
W |Z ′ ∼ ∅|∆. Then X |Y ∪ Y ′ W |Z ∪ Z ′ if and only if Y |Y ∪ Y ′  Z|Z ∪ Z ′.
Proof. Note that since X |Y ∼ W |Z and X |Y ′ ∼ W |Z ′, we know Y, Y ′, Z, Z ′ 6∈
N and can be conditioned on freely. Thus, by Part 3 of Lemma 4, it follows
that Y ∪ Y ′ and Z ∪Z ′ are non-null, and so we can condition on them freely as
well. Now we proceed.
In the left to right direction, suppose X |Y ∪ Y ′  W |Z ∪ Z ′. Suppose for
the sake of contradiction that Y |Y ∪Y ′ 6 Z|Z∪Z ′. By Axiom 1, it follows that
Y |Y ∪ Y ′ ≻ Z|Z ∪ Z ′.
Define:
A = Y ∪ Y ′, A′ = Z ∪ Z ′
B = Y B′ = Z
C = X ∩ Y, C′ =W ∩ Z
By Axiom 4, C|B = X ∩ Y |Y ∼ X |Y and C′|B′ = W ∩ Z|Z ∼ W |Z, and by
assumption, X |Y ∼ W |Z. Thus, C|B ∼ C′|B′. Further, by assumption of the
reductio, B|A = Y |Y ∪ Y ′ ≻ W |Z ∪ Z ′ = B′|A′. So by Axiom 6b, it follows
that C|A ≻ C′|A′, i.e., that X ∩ Y |Y ∪ Y ′ ≻ W ∩ Z|Z ∪ Z ′. Further, because
Z∩Z ′ = ∅ andW |Z ′ ∼ ∅|∆, it follows from Lemma 16 thatW∩Z ′|Z∪Z ′ ∼ ∅|∆.
Hence, X ∩ Y ′|Y ∪ Y ′ W ∩ Z ′|Z ∪ Z ′ by Lemma 1. So we’ve shown that
X ∩ Y |Y ∪ Y ′ ≻W ∩ Z|Z ∪ Z ′, and
X ∩ Y ′|Y ∪ Y ′ W ∩ Z ′|Z ∪ Z ′.
Because Y ∩ Y ′ = Z ∩ Z ′ = ∅, applying Axiom 5 to these equations yields
X ∩ (Y ∪Y ′)|Y ∪Y ′ ≻W ∩ (Z ∪Z ′)|Z ∪Z ′. Applying Axiom 4 to both sides of
the equation yields X |Y ∪ Y ′ ≻W |Z ∪ Z ′, which contradicts our assumption.
In the right to left direction, suppose Y |Y ∪ Y ′  Z|Z ∪ Z ′. We must show
X |Y ∪ Y ′ W |Z ∪ Z ′. We first show that
X ∩ Y |Y ∪ Y ′ W ∩ Z|Z ∪ Z ′ (23)
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That argument will use the assumption that X |Y ∼W |Z. We then prove
X ∩ Y ′|Y ∪ Y ′ ∼W ∩ Z ′|Z ∪ Z ′ (24)
That argument will use the assumption that X |Y ′ ∼ W |Z ′ ∼ ∅|∆. Because
Y ∩ Y ′ = Z ∩Z ′ = ∅ (and hence (X ∩ Y )∩ (X ∩ Y ′) = (W ∩Z)∩ (W ∩Z ′) = ∅
), applying Axiom 5 to Equation 23 and Equation 24 yields
(X ∩ Y ) ∪ (X ∩ Y ′)|Y ∪ Y ′  (W ∩ Z) ∪ (W ∩ Z ′)|Z ∪ Z ′.
Applying Axiom 4 to both sides of that equation yields the desired conclusion
that X |Y ∪ Y ′ W |Z ∪ Z ′.
To prove Equation 23, define:
A = Y ∪ Y ′, A′ = Z ∪ Z ′
B = Y B′ = Z
C = X ∩ Y, C′ =W ∩ Z
By Axiom 4, C|B = X ∩ Y |Y ∼ X |Y and C′|B′ = W ∩ Z|Z ∼ W |Z. Since
X |Y ∼ W |Z by assumption, we have C|B ∼ C′|B′. And our assumption that
Y |Y ∪ Y ′  Z|Z ∪Z ′ means that B|A  B′|A′. From Axiom 6b, it follows that
C|A  C′|A′, i.e., that X ∩ Y |Y ∪ Y ′ W ∩ Z|Z ∪ Z ′.
To prove Equation 24, notice that, sinceX |Y ′ ∼ ∅|∆ by assumption, Lemma 16
immediately entails X ∩ Y ′|Y ∪ Y ′ ∼ ∅|∆. By the same reasoning, because
W |Z ′ ∼ ∅|∆ by assumption, it follows that W ∩Z ′|Z ∪Z ′ ∼ ∅|∆. By transitiv-
ity (specifically Axiom 1), X ∩ Y ′|Y ∪ Y ′ ∼W ∩ Z ′|Z ∪ Z ′ as desired.
Lemma 18. Suppose B1, . . . , Bn partition G. Further, suppose A|Bi ∼ Ci|Bi
for all i ≤ n . If A ∩ G 6∈ N , then Bi|A ∩ G ∼ Bi ∩ Ci|
⋃
j≤n Bj ∩ Cj for all
i ≤ n.
Lemma 18 can be thought of as an application of Bayes’ theorem combined
with the Law of Total Probability. If Ci = C for all i, then quantitative analog
of the lemma asserts the following: if B1 . . . Bn partition G and P (A|Bi) =
P (C|Bi) for all i, then P (Bi|A∩G) = P (Bi|C ∩G) for all i. That claim follows
easily from an application of Bayes’ theorem and the Law of Total Probability.
Proof. We first prove that if A ∩ G 6∈ N , then
⋃
j≤n Bj ∩ Cj 6∈ N , and so the
expressions in the statement of the lemma are well-defined.
Because A ∩ G =
⋃
i≤nA ∩ Bi, it follows from Part 4 of Lemma 6 that
A ∩Bi 6∈ N for some i ≤ n. Thus, Bi 6∈ N since A ∩Bi ⊆ Bi. Further, A|Bi ≻
∅|Bi, for otherwise, A∩Bi|∆  ∅|∆ by Lemma 7 and A∩Bi ∈ N , contradicting
assumption. Finally, since A|Bi ∼ Ci|Bi, it follows that Ci|Bi ≻ ∅|Bi. It follows
quickly, via the same sequence of lemmata that we just used, that Ci ∩Bi 6∈ N ,
and hence,
⋃
j≤n Bj ∩ Cj 6∈ N since Ci ∩Bi ⊆
⋃
j≤n Bj ∩ Cj .
Now we prove the lemma by induction on n. In the base case, when n = 1,
B1 = G. Then:
G|A ∩G ∼ A ∩G|A ∩G by Axiom 4
∼ C1 ∩G|C1 ∩G by Axiom 3
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which is the desired equality.
For the inductive step, assume B1, . . . , Bn+1 partition G and A|Bi ∼ Ci|Bi
for all i ≤ n + 1. Let G′ = G \ Bn+1. Clearly, B1, . . . , Bn partition G′ and
A|Bi ∼ Ci|Bi for all i ≤ n. We consider three cases: either one of A ∩ G′ or
A∩Bn+1 are not members of N or neither of them are (since A∩G /∈ N , they
cannot both be members of N ).
Case 1: A ∩ G′, A ∩ Bn+1 /∈ N We handle the difficult case first. By the
inductive hypothesis:
Bi|A ∩G
′ ∼ Bi ∩Ci|
⋃
j≤n
Bj ∩ Cj for all i ≤ n (25)
Equation 25 also holds for i = n+1 because both Bn+1 ∩ (A∩G
′) and (Bn+1 ∩
Cn+1) ∩
⋃
j≤n Bj ∩ Cj are empty. Thus, we can use Axiom 4 and Lemma 2 to
get Equation 25. Further, it’s easy to show that for all i ≤ n+ 1:
Bi|A ∩Bn+1 ∼ Bi ∩Ci|Bn+1 ∩ Cn+1 (26)
If i = n+1, one can simply use Axiom 4 to turn the left side into the sure event
and then use Axiom 3, just like in the base case. If i 6= n + 1, then note that
Bi ∩ (A ∩Bn+1) = (Bi ∩Ci) ∩ (Bi ∩Cn+1) = ∅. So like above, we use Axiom 4
and Lemma 2 to get the equality. Our goal is to show:
Bi|A ∩G ∼ Bi ∩ Ci|
⋃
j≤n+1
Bj ∩ Cj for all i ≤ n+ 1 (27)
Equation 27 would follow if we could union the conditioning events in Equation 25
and Equation 26. Lemma 17 was designed for that purpose. Let i be arbitrary
and define:
X = Bi W = Bi ∩ Ci
Y = A ∩Bn+1 Z = Bn+1 ∩ Cn+1
Y ′ = A ∩G Z ′ =
⋃
k≤n
Bk ∩ Ck
We want to apply Lemma 17, so we first check all the conditions. Note that
Y ∩ Y ′ = Z ∩ Z ′ = ∅, since the Bi’s are disjoint. Further, X |Y ∼ W |Z is
simply Equation 26 and X |Y ′ ∼ W |Z ′ is Equation 25. Lastly, if i = n + 1,
X |Y ′ = Bi|A∩G′ ∼ ∅|∆ by the disjointness of Bn+1 and G′, along with Axiom
4, and Lemma 2. If i ≤ n, X |Y = Bi|A ∩ Bn+1 ∼ ∅|∆, again because Bi and
Bn+1 are disjoint. In this case, we can simply swap Y with Y
′ and Z with Z ′
when applying the lemma. With the conditions satisfied, Lemma 17 tells us
that Equation 27 holds if and only if Y |Y ∪ Y ′ ∼ Z|Z ∪ Z ′ i.e.:
A ∩Bn+1|A ∩G ∼ Bn+1 ∩ Cn+1|
⋃
k≤n+1
Bk ∩ Ck (28)
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To prove Equation 28, we first show:
A ∩Bn+1|G ∼ Bn+1 ∩ Cn+1|G (29)
Define:
X = G X ′ = G
Y = Bn+1 Y
′ = Bn+1
Z = A ∩Bn+1 Z
′ = Bn+1 ∩ Cn+1
Clearly, Y |X ∼ Y ′|X ′, and Z|Y = A ∩ Bn+1|Bn+1 ∼ A|Bn+1 by Axiom 4.
Similarly, Z ′|Y ′ ∼ Cn+1|Bn+1. By the assumption that A|Bi ∼ Ci|Bi for all
i ≤ n+ 1, we get Z|Y ∼ Z ′|Y ′. So Axiom 6b tells us that Z|X ∼ Z ′|X ′, which
is Equation 29.
We now prove Equation 28 by contradiction. Suppose A ∩ Bn+1|A ∩ G 6∼
Bn+1∩Cn+1|
⋃
k≤n+1 Bk ∩Ck, and without loss of generality, say A∩Bn+1|A∩
G ≻ Bn+1 ∩ Cn+1|
⋃
k≤n+1 Bk ∩ Ck. Now, define:
X = G X ′ = G
Y = A ∩G Y ′ =
⋃
k≤n+1
Bk ∩ Ck
Z = A ∩Bn+1 Z
′ = Bn+1 ∩ Cn+1
By Lemma 15 (letting Ai = A for all i), we know that A∩G|G ∼
⋃
k≤n+1 Bk ∩
Ck|G, i.e. Y |X ∼ Y ′|X ′. Note that Z|Y ≻ Z ′|Y ′ by assumption. Since
this shows that Z /∈ N , Axiom 6b entails that Z|X ≻ Z ′|X ′, contradicting
Equation 29.
Case 2: A∩G′ ∈ N , A∩Bn+1 /∈ N Notice that since A∩G′ ∈ N , A∩Bi ∈ N ,
for all i ≤ n, by Lemma 6. Thus, Bi∩Ci ∈ N , by our assumption. So, for all i ≤
n, our goal is to show thatBi|A∩G ∼ ∅. Since A∩Bi ∈ N , this follows by Axiom
4. All that remains is to show that Bn+1|A ∩G ∼ Bn+1 ∩Cn+1|
⋃
j≤n Bj ∩Cj .
Notice that Equation 26 still holds in this case. We simply apply Part 6 of
Lemma 6 to both sides of this equation, adding in A ∩G′ to the left hand side
and
⋃
j≤n Bi ∩ Ci to the right hand side, since those events are null.
Case 3: A∩Bn+1 ∈ N , A∩G′ /∈ N Since A∩Bn+1 ∈ N , Bn+1∩Cn+1 ∈ N , by
our assumption. So, Bn+1|A∩G ∼ Bn+1∩Cn+1|
⋃
j≤n Bj ∩Cj holds since both
sides are equiprobable with the emptyset. Further, Equation 25, the inductive
hypothesis, still holds in this case. Just as before, we simply apply Part 6 of
Lemma 6 to both sides of this equation, adding in A ∩ Bn+1 to the left hand
side and Bn+1 ∩ Cn+1 to the right hand side.
With these lemmas, the proof of Proposition 5 is very short.
48
Proof of Proposition 5. We apply Lemma 18. Let G = Θs = {θ1, . . . , θn} and
Bi = θi. Let A = E and Ci = F ∩ Cθi . Note that E /∈ N and Θs is a sure
event; thus, by Lemma 5, E ∩Θs = A ∩G /∈ N . Further, A|Bi ∼ Ci|Bi. Thus,
the premises of the lemma are satisfied, and Bi|A ∼ Bi ∩ Ci|
⋃
j≤n Bj ∩ Cj is
the desired conclusion.
B.4.3 Proving Proposition 6
The proof of Proposition 6 requires the following lemmata.
Lemma 19. If X |Z  ∅|Z and Y ∩ Z /∈ N , then X |Y ∩ Z ∼ ∅|Y ∩ Z.
Proof. BecauseX |Z ∼ ∅|Z, Lemma 7 entails that X∩Z|∆  ∅∩Z|∆ = ∅|∆. By
Lemma 3, we know that X∩Y ∩Z|∆  X∩Z|∆ because X∩Y ∩Z ⊆ X∩Z. By
transitivity, X∩Y ∩Z|∆  ∅|∆. We can then apply Lemma 7 (since Y ∩Z /∈ N )
to obtain X |Y ∩ Z  ∅|Y ∩ Z. Also, by Lemma 1, X |Y ∩ Z  ∅|Y ∩ Z. Thus,
we get X |Y ∩ Z ∼ ∅|Y ∩ Z as desired.
Lemma 20. SupposeX = X1∪X2, whereX1∩X2 = ∅. SupposeX1|Y ∩G∩Z ∼
X2|Y ∩ (G \ Z). Further, suppose that both
i. X1|(G \ Z) ∼ ∅|Z, and
ii. X2|(G \ Z) ∼ ∅|Z.
Then X |Y ∩G ∼ X1|Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ X2|Y ∩ (G \ Z).
Proof. First, suppose that X ∩ Y ∩ G ∈ N . Then, X |Y ∩ G ∼ ∅|Y ∩ G. We
also claim that X1|Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ ∅|Y ∩G ∩ Z, which gives us the desired result
by Lemma 2. Suppose this wasn’t the case – since Y ∩ G ∩ Z /∈ N , we know
that X1|Y ∩ G ∩ Z ≻ ∅|Y ∩ G ∩ Z. We can use Axiom 5 to add this with
X2|Y ∩G ∩ Z  ∅|Y ∩G ∩ Z (Lemma 1), getting X |Y ∩G ∩Z ≻ ∅|Y ∩G ∩ Z.
Note that by Lemma 6, that since X ∩Y ∩G ∈ N we know that X |Y ∩G∩Z ∼
∅|Y ∩G ∩ Z, we thus get the desired contradiction.
We know assumeX∩Y ∩G /∈ N . By applying Lemma 19 (since Y ∩(G\Z) /∈
N ) and Lemma 2 to (i), we get that X1|Y ∩ (G \ Z) ∼ ∅|Y ∩G ∩ Z. Now, we
apply Axiom 5 as follows:
∅|Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ X1|Y ∩ (G \ Z) (30)
X1|Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ X2|Y ∩ (G \ Z) Given
(31)
X1|Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ X1 ∪X2|Y ∩ (G \ Z) Axiom 5 on Equation 30 and Equation 31
(32)
We apply the same steps to (ii). Using Lemma 19 (since Y ∩ G ∩ Z /∈ N ) and
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Lemma 2, we get X2|Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ ∅|Y ∩ (G \ Z). Then, we apply Axiom 5:
X2|Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ ∅|Y ∩ (G \ Z) (33)
X1|Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ X2|Y ∩ (G \ Z) Given
(34)
X1 ∪X2|Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ X2|Y ∩ (G \ Z) Axiom 5 on Equation 33 and Equation 34
(35)
Because X1|Y ∩ G ∩ Z ∼ X2|Y ∩ (G \ Z), from Equation 32 and Equation 35
we get X |Y ∩G ∩ Z ∼ X |Y ∩ (G \ Z).
Now, suppose for the sake of contradiction that X |Y ∩ G 6∼ X |Y ∩ G ∩ Z.
We know that Y ∩G∩Z /∈ N by the premise, which also means (via Lemma 4)
that Y ∩ G /∈ N . Thus, either X |Y ∩ G ≻ X |Y ∩ G ∩ Z or vice versa; without
loss of generality, assume X |Y ∩ G ≻ X |Y ∩ G ∩ Z. Now, we apply Lemma 8
(since we are assuming X ∩ Y ∩G /∈ N ) with:
A = Y ∩G
B = X ∩ Y ∩G B′ = Y ∩G ∩ Z
C = X ∩ Y ∩G ∩ Z
Note that the necessary containment relations hold. Since B|A ≻ C|B′, we get
B′|A ≻ C|B, or Y ∩G ∩ Z|Y ∩G ≻ X ∩ Y ∩G ∩ Z|X ∩ Y ∩G. After applying
Axiom 4, we get:
Z|Y ∩G ≻ Z|X ∩ Y ∩G (36)
Since X |Y ∩ G ∩ Z ∼ X |Y ∩ (G \ Z), we know from our contradicting
assumption that X |Y ∩G ≻ X |Y ∩ (G\Z). We now proceed as before, applying
Lemma 8 with:
A = Y ∩G
B = X ∩ Y ∩G B′ = Y ∩ (G \ Z)
C = X ∩ Y ∩ (G \ Z)
Note that the necessary containment relations hold. Since B|A ≻ C|B′, we get
B′|A ≻ C|B, or (after Axiom 4):
G \ Z|Y ∩G ≻ G \ Z|X ∩ Y ∩G (37)
Applying Axiom 5 to Equation 36 and Equation 37 gives us G|Y ∩G ≻ G|X ∩
Y ∩G. Applying Axiom 4 gives us ∆ ≻ ∆, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 21. Suppose B1, . . . , Bn partition G, and that A ∩ Bi /∈ N , for all i.
Further, suppose A ⊥Bi Ci with respect to  and for all i, j ≤ n : Ci|Bi ∼
Cj |Bj . Then, for all k ≤ n,
⋃
i≤n
Ci ∩Bi|A ∩G ∼ Ck|Bk
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Proof. Since A ⊥Bi Ci for all i ≤ n, we have by Lemma 12 that Ci ⊥Bi A. We
now proceed by induction on n. When n = 1, note that G = B1. So:⋃
i≤n
C1 ∩Bi|A ∩G = C1 ∩G|A ∩G
∼ C1|A ∩G by Axiom 4
∼ C1|G because C1 ⊥G A
For the inductive step, suppose B1, . . . , Bn+1 partition G, and define G
′ =
{B1, . . . , Bn}. Let i be arbitrary.
Note that the conditions of the inductive hypothesis are satisfied with respect
to G′ and B1, . . . , Bn. Thus, we get:⋃
j≤n
Cj ∩Bj |A ∩G
′ ∼ Ci|Bi
We also know that:
Cn+1 ∩Bn+1|A ∩Bn+1 ∼ Cn+1|A ∩Bn+1 by Axiom 4
∼ Cn+1|Bn+1 since A ⊥Bi Ci for all i
∼ Ci|Bi since Ci|Bi ∼ Cj |Bj for all i, j ≤ n+ 1
So we’ve shown that (1)
⋃
j≤n Cj ∩Bj |A∩G
′ ∼ Ci|Bi and (2) Cn+1 ∩Bn+1|A∩
Bn+1 ∼ Ci|Bi. We now apply Lemma 20 with X1 =
⋃
j≤n Cj ∩ Bj , X2 =
Cn+1 ∩ Bn+1, Y = A, Z = G′ and G = G. We have shown (from (1) and (2))
that X1|Y ∩G∩Z ∼ X2|Y ∩ (G \Z). Note that X1|(G \Z) ∼ ∅|Z by Axiom 4,
as X1 ∩ (G \Z) = ∅. Similarly, X2|G∩Z ∼ ∅. With the conditions satisfied, we
get X |Y ∩G ∼ X1|Y ∩G∩Z or
⋃
j≤n+1 Cj ∩Bj |A∩G ∼
⋃
j≤n Cj ∩Bj |A∩G
′.
And from (1), we get
⋃
j≤n+1 Cj ∩Bj |A ∩G ∼ Ci|Bi, as desired.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let ΘF = {θ1, . . . , θn} and let Bi = {θi}. Thus, G =
ΘF . Let A = F and Ci = Cθi . The conditions of Lemma 21 are satisfied by the
assumptions of the proposition, and thus
⋃
η∈ΘF
Cη∩η|F ∼ Cθ|θ for all θ ∈ ΘF .
Since F ⊥ θ Cθ, it follows from Lemma 12 that Cθ ⊥ θ F and so Cθ|θ ∼ Cθ|F ∩θ.
Thus, we’ve shown:
⋃
η∈ΘF
Cη ∩ η|F ∼ Cθ|F ∩ θ (38)
Now, we apply Lemma 8 with:
A = F
B =
⋃
η∈ΘF
F ∩ Cη ∩ η B
′ = F ∩ θ
C = F ∩ Cθ ∩ θ
Equation 38 says B|A ∼ C|B′. So by Lemma 8, we get B′|A ∼ C|B, which is
the desired conclusion.
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